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SCANDAL IN THE US AND AUSTRALIAN WINE INDUSTRY! TRADEMARKS AND
GIS AS A CONSUMER MAGNET?
SARAH HINCHLIFFE*
I. INTRODUCTION
1

New World wine – in particular those sourced from jurisdictions subject to an
2
EU trade in wine bilateral treaty – face an inexorable position of carving out a
3
consumer-appealing niche in an already dense global market. When faced with a
4
choice of a New World wine of similar price and quality, consumer preference is
5
influenced not necessarily by the specific geographic source of the wine, but rather
6
the label pizzazz factor. This is apparent when compared to European counterparts.
* © Sarah Hinchliffe 2019.
Ph.D, Assistant Professor (The University of Akron); AIIFL
Honorary Fellow (The University of Hong Kong).
1 The New World comprises jurisdictions including: Australia, Canada, the United States,
South Africa, and Asia. The Old World, by comparison, refers to Europe. For a discussion of the Old
World and New World, see generally, OZ CLARKE, WINE ATLAS—WINES AND WINE REGIONS OF THE
WORLD (1995, Little-Brown); see generally RICHARD P. MENDELSON, FROM DEMON TO DARLING: A
LEGAL HISTORY OF WINE IN AMERICA (University of California Press, 2009).
2 There are several bilateral treaties with respect to wine geographical indications between the
EU and other jurisdictions. See generally, Agreement between the United States of America and the
European Community on Trade in Wine, signed 10 March 2006 O.J. (L 87) (entered into force 10
March 2006) (‘EU-US Wine Agreement’); Agreement between the European Community and
Australia on Trade in Wine [1994] OJ L 86/94, superseded by the Agreement between the European
Community and Australia on Trade in Wine [2009] OJ L28/3 (entered into force 1 September 2010)
(‘EU-Australia Wine Agreement’). Reference to “jurisdiction” is in place of “countries” since the EC is
not strictly a country.
3 For a discussion of the global wine market, see Linda Bisson et al, The Present and Future of
the International Wine Industry, 418(8) INSIGHT PROGRESS 696, 696 (2002); Giulia Meloni and Johan
Swinnen, The Rise and Fall of the World’s Largest Wine Exporter – And Its Institutional Legacy, 9(1)
J. WINE ECON. 3, 9-10 (2014); Won Fy Leea & William C Gartner, The Effect of Wine Policy on the
Emerging Cold-Hardy Wine Industry in the Northern U.S. States, 4(1) WINE ECON. & POLICY 35, 43
(2015); Alan E Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, The Politics of Wine: Trade Barriers, Interest Groups, and the
Commerce Clause, 69(3) J. POLITICAL ECON. 859, 869 (2007); OIV, State of the Vitiviniculture World
Market 2015 (1 March 2017), https://en.vinex.market/articles.
4 Wine oenology is not discussed in this article. But see Lisa Barriger, Global Warming and
Viticulture: The Ability of Wine Regions to Adapt in Differing Regulatory Schemes 19 PENN. ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (2011) (discussing oenology and legal frameworks); Peter Combris et al, Food
Choices: What do we Learn From Combining Sensory and Economic Experiments? 20(8) FOOD
QUALITY & PREFERENCE 550, 555-7 (2009); Alan Guth, Quantitation and Sensory Studies of
Character Impact Odorants of Different White Wine Varieties, 45 J. AGRICULTURE & FOOD
CHEMISTRY 3027, 3029-32 (1997).
5 Reference to geographic source is construed broadly, and includes: GIs, AOCs, mis-descriptive
marks, AVAs, etc. See infra, discussing the scope of the “source” of wine in a geographic sense
referred to in this article. See also Antonio Stanziani, Wine Reputation and Quality Controls: The
Origin of The AOCs in 19th Century France 18(2) EU. J. L. & ECON 149, 156-7 (2004).
6 For a discussion about wine preference of European individuals, see Dwijen Rangnekar, 2004,
”Demanding Stronger Protection for Geographical Indications: The Relationship Between Local
Knowledge, Information and Reputation, UNU-INTECH Discussion Paper Series 25), United
Nations University.
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Labelling laws (e.g. 27 C.F.R Subpart D, and Part VIA of the Wine Australia 2013 Act
(Cth)) and intellectual property regimes (e.g. geographical indication regimes,
geographic mis-descriptive marks, and the trademark regime more broadly) prima
7
facie appear to dampen innovation in branding. This is particularly so for emerging
8
New World wines.
This article identifies branding opportunities for New World wineries –
particularly in the United States (US) and Australia – to capitalize on innovation in
branding without breaching a jurisdiction’s legal obligations. It highlights that
wineries in the New World have a plethora of opportunity to create a unique brand.
At the same time, it identifies traps to avoid in creating a spunk or pizazz effect in
branding – including trademarks otherwise classified as ‘scandalous’.
First, an outline of the wine industry in Australia and the United States is
provided. This section sets out current federal law with respect to labelling of wines
and intellectual property regimes. Second, a practical outlook of consumer preference
for wine including research identifying the extent to which consumers place on
information on wine labels. The third section identifies common ground of these legal
regimes (i.e. label laws and intellectual property regimes with respect to wine as a
consumption good) and relevant legal theory. Emerging from an analysis of this
nexus is what this article describes as ‘branding preference’. The final section
identifies opportunities stemming from cases such as In re Brunetti and Tam, the
elements that comprise an acceptable and innovative brand for use by wineries in
New World jurisdictions and those falling short of being considered ‘scandalous.’ A
summary of practical considerations for branding opportunities and future legislative
insights draws this article to a close.
A. Wine Labelling Laws
Each jurisdiction has its own flavor of objectives (including cultural,
constitutional and historical factors) that underpin operative wine labelling laws.
9
The First Amendment to the United States’ Constitution (free speech), for example,
defies suppression of free expression. When it comes to information on labels this
Constitutional right, prima facie, precipitates a conflict between [commercial] rights
10
11
of wine producers and other consumer interests. This, in essence, presents a
See also, LEON SCHIFFMAN AND LESSLIE KANUK, CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR (Prentice Hall, 9th ed.,
2007) (noting that country-of-origin perceptions and expectations lead to cognitions. It also puts
significance on particular products and marketing attributes. These were considered as the factors
that could bring affect to the people in the country of where the product or services were market).
7 For the definition of branding, see infra.
8 Reference to emerging New World wines includes new entrants (e.g. new wineries and wine
products) located in New World jurisdictions, also existing New World wineries and wine products
that may not necessarily be broadly known by consumers. Compare, e.g. “Yellow Tail” and “Jacobs
Creek.” See also Ernst Walker and Annette Brown, How Do Owners of Small Businesses Measure
Their Success?, 22(6) INT. SMALL BUS. J. 573, 574 (2004).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Keith Werhan, The O’Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19
Ariz. St. L.J. 635, 638 (1987).
10 See, e.g. Sarah Hinchliffe, Opus Wine: An Optimum Framework for Wine within a Supply
Chain (November 2017) (Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, Victoria University, at 1.2.1) (on file
with author).
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balancing act between constitutional entitlement to free speech and other rights and
12
interests of stakeholders. Since Australia lacks an overt freedom of speech clause in
13
14
its constitution,
and instead places emphasis on consumer protection,
the
balancing act is comparatively subtle.
The following paragraphs outline the regulatory and administrative aspects of
wine labels. It then compares the term ‘wine origin’ in Australia and the US which
forms the basis of further comparative discussion in this article.
1. Regulation and Administration of Wine Labels

11 Consumer interests include not being misled or deceived as to the product. There are,
however, statutory requirements setting out inclusion of health warnings: See Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2009) (authorizing graphic warnings on
cigarettes); Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Wine Laws and
Regulations, http://www.ttb.gov/wine/wine_regs.shtml (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) (outlining U.S.
wine laws and regulations). For a discussion about purported conflict between Free Speech and
health warnings, see David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The
Clash Between The Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and The Public Interest in Effective
Protection From Harm, 37 AM J LAW MED (2011) 299-314 (2011). See also Disc. Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had upheld Congress's authority to mandate graphic warnings); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,
564 U.S. 552 (2011) (the Supreme Court rejected Vermont's effort to restrict the use of prescription
data by drug companies' sales representatives). Even though the Supreme Court let the Sixth
Circuit's decision stand, its effect is limited. The Sixth Circuit considered only whether Congress
may require some graphic warnings. The D.C. Circuit considered the constitutionality of the
FDA's actual warnings. Even as the Supreme Court has narrowed the power of government to
regulate corporate speech, it has preserved an important authority to regulate. The graphic
warnings seemed to fall within that authority. The preserved authority reflects the distinction the
Supreme Court makes between the regulation of corporate speech that informs and the regulation of
corporate speech that misinforms. On the one hand, the Court usually objects when the government
tries to block truthful speech by businesses. On the other hand, the Court typically approves when
the government tries to prevent false or deceptive speech by businesses. For example, the
government may forbid companies from saying things that are not true. It also may require
companies to make disclosures that will allow consumers to make informed choices and not be
misled by advertising hype. Common disclosure requirements include the corporate prospectus for
stock offerings, the total interest payments for a home mortgage, nutritional information for foods,
and the textual warnings for cigarettes: See Sarah Hinchliffe, Comparing Apples and Oranges 13
JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 999 (2013).
12 For a detailed discussion of stakeholder rights and interests in the contents of wine, see
Hinchliffe supra n 10, at 1.2.1. See also Ilenia Bregoli et al, Challenges in Italian Wine Routes:
Managing Stakeholder Networks, 19(2) QUALITATIVE MARKET RESEARCH J. 204, 218 (2016).
13 See Australian Constitution.
14 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch. 2, and second reading speech.
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For the most part, labelling requirements–including what must appear on a
wine label–is administered at a national level in the US and Australia. The Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB)–a federal agency–determines the
requirements for wine production and labelling, including the designation of
Figure 1

Regulation and Administration of Wine Labels in the United States (Federal)
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16

American Viticultural Areas (AVAs). The TTB administers the Webb-Kenyon Act,
17
and the Alcoholic Beverage Labelling Act,
which prescribes a ‘Government
18
Warning’ on all alcoholic beverage labels (See Figure 1). There are also labelling
19
requirements imposed under State instruments.

15
See Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, History of TB available at
http://www.ttb.gov/abo ut/history.shtml (highlighting the role and mission of the 1TB). In order to
further the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) mission of assuring that the products it regulates
are safe and truthfully labeled,1 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) gives the
FDA the power to enforce prohibitions on labelling that causes a food, drug, cosmetic, or medical
device to be misbranded: Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Hereinafter after the FFD&C Act),
SS3O1(a), 301(g), 301(k) (1938).
16 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
17 27 U.S.C. § § 213-219(a) (2006).
18 27 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2006).
19 27 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2012) defines an ‘appellation of origin’ for use on wine, and its use on a label
(for both US wine and imported wine) is subject to meeting requirements under this regulation: See
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In Australia, Wine Australia (comprising the Australian Grape and Wine
Authority (AGWA)) and the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources oversee
20
the compliance of wine labelling requirements. In addition to the Wine Australia
21
22
Act 2013 (Cth), the Food Standards Code, the National Measurement Act 1960
23
(Cth), and the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) collectively govern wine
24
labels (see Figure 2).

Id.; See generally Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Wine Appellations of Origin, available
at http://www.ttb.gov/appellation/. The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) agents
investigate alcohol permits for wineries; work in the enforcement of regulations of the alcohol
industry; and prevent misleading labelling. See also David H McElreath et al., Introduction to Law
Enforcement (CRC Press, 2013) 131.
20 Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth), ss. 6 and 7. The term “label law” is defined in the Wine
Australia Act 2013 (Cth) s. 4.
21 Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth), pt. VIA (Label Integrity Program (LIP)). The LIP provisions
were introduced in September 2010 to provide a more comprehensive system to ensure that
Australian wine laws comply with treaty requirements, and also protect the integrity of Australian
wine overseas. See respectively, Agreement between the European Community and Australia on
Trade in Wine [1994] OJ L 86/94, superseded by the Agreement between the European Community
and Australia on Trade in Wine [2009] OJ L28/3 [hereinafter “EC-Australia Agreement”]. The LIP
applies directly to wine and does not apply to other products such as tobacco.
22 See Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991 (Cth). See also Food Standards Code
2013 (Cth). Standard 1.2.1 of the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code sets out the
requirements to have labels or otherwise information provided. Coupled with Standard 1.2.11,
which sets out particular information requirements, the country of origin and GI is required to be
stated on the label of an Australia wine product: See also Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth), s. 40D
(False descriptions and presentations). Effective 1 July 2016 (but mandatory from 1 July 2018), the
Competition and Consumer Amendment (Country of Origin) Act 2017 (Cth) requires labels to include
a product’s Country of Origin Labelling. Standard 1.2.7 (Nutrition, health and related claims)
requires that “pregnancy health warnings” appear on wine products.
23 Section 40F of the Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth), for example, expressly prohibits misleading
descriptions and presentations on wines, and pursuant to s. 40E wine that is sold, imported to, or
exported from Australia cannot contain misleading a description or presentation. Other consumer
protection laws, such as the Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Cth), similarly endorse the need to
provide consumers with accurate information about a good or service.
24 Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 40 (In the event of misleading
or deceptive conduct in the supply of a wine product, the appropriate forum to commence an action
is the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT)).
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Figure 2

Regulation and Administration of Wine Labels in Australia (Federal)
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Many wine bottles have two labels–a front label (which “names” the wine and/or
25
“brand,” and can catch the consumer’s eye); and the back label (which may set out
26
further information about the wine product, ingredients and health warnings).
27
Statutory instruments require the inclusion of a source identifier of the wine, which
28
includes at the very least the “country of origin” (i.e. the geographic source).
The next section explains the scope of each of these terms, and notes that while
the “source” of wine plays a role in influencing a consumer’s purchase decision, it is
not the only factor.
2. The Source of Wine
29

It is mandatory to include on a wine label the “source” of wine.
Statutory
30
requirements in the US and Australia prohibit false descriptions on a wine label.
What is considered to be mis-descriptive, however, is broadly encompassing in
Australia than in the US. Similarly, what is considered to be a wine’s source for the
purpose of identifying a wine differs.
25 The term “name,” refers to the “brand” of the wine, and not the variety of grapes. For the
purpose of this article, a “brand” may be a trademark (either registered or unregistered).
26 Statutory label requirements do not necessarily require other than a front label.
27 The requirement includes that the country of origin be included on the front label, but there
is no definition of front label.
28 See infra.
29 The term “source” is not explicitly referred to in statutory instruments. For example, this is
implied in 27 C.F.R. § 4.32 and 4.33(b) (2013). Other elements of branding, while not mandatory on
a wine label, when included or used in commerce are governed at a federal level in both the US and
Australia. See infra. A comprehensive discussion is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
30 In the case of Australia, see Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. In the case of
the U.S., see 27 C.F.R. § 4.32 (2013).
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United States
Title 27 of the C.F.R. § 4.32 sets out the mandatory label information for wine,
31
including the need to display the “brand.” Strictly speaking it is erroneous to use
the terms “trademark” and “brand” interchangeably. A brand represents an entity’s
reputation and business. In its simplest form, it is an image; what the public sees
and thinks about an entity. Whereas a trademark is a legal embodiment of those
aspects of an entity’s brand that are unique and specific to that entity. For example,
logos, specific combinations of colours, shapes and design layout, or any other aspect
of a brand that is unique from anyone else. Viewed another way: all trademarks are
brands, while not all brands are trademarks.
Section 4.33 sets out the context for defining the term “brand,” and which
prohibits any such brand name “. . . standing alone, or in association with other
printed or graphic matter” to create:
“. . . any impression or inference as to the age, origin, identity, or other
characteristics of the product… conveys no erroneous impressions as to the
age, origin, identity, or other characteristics of the product.”32
The source of wine pursuant to this section may therefore be construed
33
broadly.
Identity and origin may refer to not just geographical origin or
34
geographical identity of a wine (e.g. an American Vinicultural Area (AVA)), but
moreso the identity or origin in a trademark sense. Flowing from this, geographical
origins are protected through the trademark regime as “certification marks” under
35
US federal law. The term ‘certification mark’ is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 as:
“. . . any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... [that
is used to] certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture,
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of . . .goods or services . . . .”
In the case of a geographic certification mark, freedom to define the standard is
36
37
constrained, as only firms in the particular geographic area may use the term.
27 CFR § 4.32(a)(1) (2013).
27 C.F.R. § 4.32 (2013).
33 See Hinchliffe supra n. 10.
34 See infra.
35 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2006) (authorizing a refusal to
register a mark which “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them”); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2006) (authorizing a
refusal to register a mark which “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
primarily geographically descriptive of them”).
36 Unlike in a certification mark regime where the mark owner generally has greater freedom to
do so. See Id.
37 A certification mark is used by third parties to indicate that goods or service being offered
conform to the standards or characteristics established by the mark’s owner: See 15 U.S.C. § 1064
(2006). For cases discussing challenges to certification marks, see, e.g., Levy v. Kosher Overseers
Ass’n of Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997); and Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich,
Inc., 303 F.2d 494 (2d. Cir. 1962).
31

32 See

[18:421 2019]Scandal in the US and Australian Wine Industry! Trademarks and GIs
As a Consumer Magnet?
429

There is, as will be discussed, a measure of elasticity in classifying a geographic
38
39
area. An AVA, for example, is one way that a wine’s geographic area is delineated.
The AVA system – which began in 1980 – essentially sought to distinguish
smaller wine grape-growing regions and was in response to the need to comply with
40
international rules.
States also have an additional “local” tier by virtue of
41
ordinances, that apply to a particular wine region.
Section 4.25(e)(1)(i) of the
42
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau Regulations (TTB regulations) defines
a viticultural area for American wine as a delimited grape-growing region having
distinguishing features as described in Pt. 9 of the regulations and a name and
delineated boundary as established in Pt. 9 of the regulations. Part 4 of the TTB
43
regulations allows the establishment of definitive viticultural areas and the use of
their names as appellations of origin on wine labels and in wine advertisements.
44
Unlike the AOC system in France, AVAs can overlap political boundaries such
as state and county lines as well as other AVAs, and may be referred to even if
grapes are sourced from an adjoining AVA. Section 4.25 sets out the eligibility
requirements for the use of an appellation of origin. Section 4.25(a)(1) of the TTB
45
regulations defines an appellation of origin for American wine as:
(i) The United States;
(ii) a State, or
(iii) two or no more than three contiguous States;
(iv) a county, or
(v) two or no more than three counties from the same State; or
(vi) a viticultural area.
46

Section 4.25(e)(3) of the TTB regulations, in part, sets forth the requirements
for labelling American wine with an AVA as an appellation of origin.

38 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (authorizing a refusal to register a mark which “when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them”). See
infra.
39 27 C.F.R. § 4.91 (2011)
(American Viticultural Areas). In 1978, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms developed regulations to establish AVAs based on distinctive climate and
geographical features. The previous system designated appellations based on state or county
boundaries: see Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, American Viticultural Area
http://www.ttb.gov/wine/ava.shtml.
40 There are 234 AVAs across the US: See The Wine Institute, American Viticultural Areas (31
December 2016), https://www.wineinstitute.org. See Michael Hall et al., Wine Tourism Around the
World (Routledge, 2009) 266 (outlining that it was also to facilitate the US compete in export
markets against wines from countries with more developed quality control methods).
41 A discussion of this is beyond the scope of this article, but see Hinchliffe, supra n 10.
42 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(e)(1)(i) (2012).
43 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (2006).
44 Hinchliffe, supra n 10.
45 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(a)(1) (2012).
46 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(e)(3) (2012).
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As depicted in Figure 3, in order for a wine to be labelled to have come from a
certain AVA region, therefore, it must include at least 85 percent of the grapes from
that particular region (i.e. grapes of listed origin – e.g. Williamsburg VA), without
47
complying with any restrictions of the winemaking techniques.

Figure 3

Classification Requirements for

(USA) AVAs

3. Regional Boundary

1. SUB
AVA

COUNTY / STATE / US
BOUNDARY (must contain
75% of listed origin)

Sub-AVA
Non-official term describing an AVA
within another larger AVA. E.g.
Russian River Valley

2. AVA
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Columbia Valley

(France) AOC
EU DIRECTIVES OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

SPECIAL CLASSIFICATION
Regional “cru” or vineyard
classification

1. AOC

3. Vin De
France

COMMUNE/VILLAGE
e.g. Saint Julien
SUB-REGIONAL
e.g. Médoc
REGIONAL

2. IGP (Indication Géographiquee.g.
Protégée)
Burgundy

1

1

National IP laws of France recognise that AOC comprise special classification, reference to a commune, sub-regional and regional
origin of wine: Code de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 17 mars 2017), Art. L. 721-2. The AOC level is encompassed

47 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(e)(3)(iii) (2012); see also Jim E O’Connor, Rebecca J Dorsey and Ian Madin,
Volcanoes to Vineyards: Geologic Field Trips Through the Dynamic Landscape of the Pacific
Northwest (Geological Society of America, 2009) 2.
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(Italy) DOC
EU DIRECTIVES OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

1. DOC
3. VDT (vino

DOCG (Denominazione di origine
controllata e gorontita
e.g. Chiani

da Travola)

2. IGT (IndicazioneDOC
Geografica
(Denominazione
Tipica)di origine
e.g. Merlot

controllata)
e.g. Saint Julien

2

within the IGP, which forms part of a broader national reference to ‘Vin De France’. Domestic laws and legal regimes in this context
are subject to operation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Jurisdictions such as Victoria, by comparison, do not have this trilevel. Instead, reference to GIs reflects a hollow IGP level, comprising regional classifications. The Intellectual Property Code
recognises a parallel system of trade mark registration alongside geographical indications (GIs) (as defined in Article L. 721-2): Code
de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 17 mars 2017). See Id, Art. R714-3 (providing that: “The indications referred to in
Article R. 714-2 shall be inscribed on the initiative of the National Institute of Industrial Property or, in the case of a judicial decision,
at the request of the Registrar or on Request of one of the parties. Only final judicial decisions may be entered in the National Register
of Trademarks. Title II of the Code sets out governing rules of GIs, and the system of Appellations of Origin (AOC). Article L721-1
(translated) states that: “The rules relating to the determination of appellations of origin are laid down in Article L. 115-1 of the
Consumer Code reproduced hereafter: Article L. 115-1: Constitutes an appellation of origin for the denomination of origin, A country,
region or locality used to designate a product originating in it and whose quality or characteristics are due to the geographical
environment, including natural factors and human factors.” Most countries, including France, tend to follow the general principle that
the first in time to use or register the trade mark or GI has priority. Compare, e.g. Steven Stern, The Overlap between Geographical
Indications and Trade Marks in Australia, 2 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L. 1, 5 & 17 (2001) (observing that priority in time is not the approach
being adopted in Australia, but one can only wonder whether the GIC will eventually turn down that path. If so, its attempts to be evenhanded, rather than to serve any inflexible rule, will prove very interesting. It may be that, in due course, if the ‘first in time’ rule
achieves eventual supremacy in Australia, it will be tempered or qualified by the results of these experiences. See further, Rothbury
Wines Pty Ltd v Tyrell [2008] ATMOGI 1 (indicating that the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks (as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade
Marks) will look beyond factors going to the inconvenience of the parties or to the “first in time” principle).
2
GI wines in Italy are regulated by Governmental Legislation No. 164/92 (Governmental Legislation 164/92) and by Ministerial Decree
No. 256/97 (Ministerial Decree 256/97). There are three categories, namely Controlled and Guaranteed Denomination of Origin
(DOCG), Controlled Denomination of Origin (DOC), and Typical Geographical Indication (IGT). This system does not only cater for
the needs of the European Common Market, but also protects the interests of consortia of producers, who have attempted to designate
controlled areas in the past with little success. Because of the present framework of the DOC system, most of Italy’s wineries can
enjoy a competitive advantage when it comes to the production and distribution of high-quality wines.

48

Section 4.25(b)(1) of the TTB regulations, sets out the requirements for
labelling an “American wine” with a State name as an appellation of origin. For a
wine labelled with a State appellation of origin, at least 75 percent of the wine must
be derived from fruit or agricultural products grown in the State used as the
appellation, and the wine must be fully finished in either the labelled State or in an
48

27 C.F.R. § 4.52(b)(1) (2006).
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adjacent State. For example, an AVA that falls within a general Regional Boundary
(e.g. county, state of US Boundary) must contain 75 percent of listed origin (e.g.
Virginia, Sonoma County of the US). AVAs may also contain sub-AVA’s, which is a
non-official term describing an AVA within another larger AVA (e.g. Russian River
Valley and Oakville District (both in California)).
In 2016, former § 4.25(e)(3)(iv) was removed. Amendments to regulations at
§ 4.25(e)(3)(iv) comprised allowing wines that meet the requirements of § 4.25(e)(3)(i)
and (ii) to be labelled with a single-State AVA name as an appellation of origin if the
wine was fully finished either within the State in which the AVA is located or within
an adjacent State. Preference to commercial aspects appears principal. In the case of
AVAs that cover two or more States (multi-State AVAs), the wine must be fully
50
51
finished within one of the States in which the AVA is located.
For example, Notice No. 142 in the Federal Register proposed establishing “The
52
Rocks District of Milton-Freewater” AVA in Umatilla County, Oregon. The effect of
removing the requirement in § 4.25(e)(3)(iv) meant that wines labelled with an AVA
appellation of origin need not only be fully finished within the same State as the
AVA. For example, those that used grapes grown within The Rocks District of
Milton-Freewater but fully finish their wines using custom crush facilities across the
49 The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) under the Department of the Treasury
(see Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2002)) was designed to collect alcohol, tobacco, firearms,
and ammunition excise taxes; protect the consumer, assist industry members to comply with federal
tax, product, and marketing requirements associated with winemaking: JOHN OKRAY, INSIDE THE
WORLD’S LARGEST LEGAL EMPLOYER: CAREERS AND COMPENSATION WITH U.S. FEDERAL AGENCIES
(Lawyerup Press, 2010) 110. To monitor compliance with AVAs and control the production of wine in
the U.S., the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (in 2003) split functions of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) into two new organizations with separate functions.
50 T.D. ATF-53, published in the Federal Register by TTB’s predecessor agency, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) at 43 FR 37672 (23 August 1978. Prior to publication of that
Treasury Decision, ATF did not have codified definitions for “appellation of origin” or “viticultural
area,” and there was no systematic approach to designating a region as a “viticultural area”: see id.
The ATF regulatory requirements for the use of an appellation of origin on a wine label prior to T.D.
ATF-53 stated that: (1) At least 75 percent of the wine be derived from fruit or other agricultural
products grown in the named region; (2) the wine be fully manufactured and finished within the
State containing the named region; and (3) the wine be made in compliance with the named region’s
laws and regulations.
51 Unlike the EU, the use of multi-State appellations of origin (which may consist of two or
three contiguous States) is permitted. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/199; Council Regulation
(EC) No 2392/1986; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2729/2000; Commission Regulation (EC) No
1227/2000; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1607/2000; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1622/200;
Commission Regulation (EC) No 884/2001; Commission Regulation (EC) No 753/2002; European
Parliament and Council Regulation 1151/2012. EU and member state laws are not discussed in this
article. Where this is the case, § 4.25(d)(1) requires that all the fruit or other agricultural products
used in the wine be grown in the States indicated in the appellation and that the wine must be fully
finished within one of those States. Wine is considered to be “fully finished” if it is ready to be
bottled, except that cellar treatment and blending that does not result in an alteration of class and
type is still permitted. This appears to water-down the very notion of an indication of source.
52 Federal Register 6931 Vol. 80, No. 26 (9 February 2015) <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2015-02-09/pdf/2015-02552.pdf.> See also 79 FR 10742; T.D. TTB-127 (which formally establishes
The Rocks District of Milton-Freewater as an AVA). The Rocks District of Milton-Freewater is an
AVA that is located near the Oregon-Washington State line, approximately 10 miles south of the city
of Walla Walla, Washington. The AVA is also located within the larger Walla Walla Valley and
Columbia Valley AVAs, both of which cover portions of Washington and Oregon.
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State line in Walla Walla, Washington, did so because there are no such facilities
nearby in Oregon. In what could be described as recognizing the commercial benefits
53
of geographic names to the wine industry, the TTB stated that:
“Vintners would have a greater choice in both where they fully finish their
wines and what appellation of origin they use . . . . Grape growers within a
single-State AVA may have more buyers for their grapes if vintners in
adjacent States are allowed to label their wines with the AVA name.”54
The AVA system was introduced to provide consumers with additional
information on the wines they may purchase by allowing vintners to describe more
accurately the origin of the grapes used in the wine. While this may be the case,
there appears to be a degree of elasticity in balancing commercial benefits that a
geographic name brings to wineries endorsing brands as a consumer magnet tool.
While AVAs may assist in an application to register a mark that is “primarily”
55
geographically descriptive, other commercial considerations, including application
56
of the First Amendment, may overshadow such registration consideration. .
Title 15, Chapter 22, Subchapter III of the U.S.C. lists several prohibitions
against the use of marks with misleading information. §1125, for example, expressly
57
prohibits false designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution. Overarching
the latter, however, is the First Amendment free speech clause which, while
benefiting commercial objectives, is vague regarding the extent to which it is capable
58
of overshadowing certain label requirements.
The use of AVA names as
appellations of origin on wine labels appears also to have broadened their system of
protecting indications of origin or source, pointing to a shift towards protection of

53 In what appears to reflect empathy towards commercial needs, the TTB took the view that
since The Rocks District of Milton-Freewater AVA is a single-State AVA located in Oregon, under
current TTB wine labelling regulations, none of these individual would be able to use that AVA
name as an appellation of origin, even if 85 percent of the grapes in their wines came from The
Rocks District of Milton-Freewater AVA–because their wines are fully finished in Washington.
Although, their wines could be labelled with the Columbia Valley or Walla Walla Valley AVA names
as appellations or origin because The Rocks District of Milton-Freewater AVA is located within both
of those AVAs, and both the Columbia Valley and Walla Walla Valley AVAs are multi-State AVAs
that cover portions of Oregon and Washington. Additionally, their wines could be labelled simply
with the political appellation “Oregon,” since wines labelled with a State appellation of origin may
be fully finished in an adjacent State.
54 Id.
55 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2006) (authorizing a refusal to register a mark which “when used on or
in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them.”)
56 See e.g. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2017), cert. granted sub nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18-302, 2019 WL 98541 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019)
(mem.). For example, after the Tam and Brunetti decisions, two of the five statutory bars of § 2(a)
remain: (1) the bar on deceptive marks and (2) the bar on marks that falsely suggest a connection
with a person. Both provisions can withstand strict scrutiny and are safe from a First Amendment
challenge.
57 See Trademark Act (Lanham Act) of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006). This article does
not address the issue of dilution of GIs.
58 See infra; See Sarah Hinchliffe, Does the First Amendment of the Constitution (Free Speech)
Detract From Effective Information Channels?” (on file with author).
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rights under the trademark system – i.e. geographic certification marks. It could
also be described as endorsing the First Amendment to the United States’
60
Constitution.
Australia
Australia adopts a registration system that recognizes indications of geography,
61
otherwise known as geographical indications (GIs). Although, unregistered GIs
59 Courts have generally held that actions under Section 43(a) require a demonstration that the
misrepresentation in question is material, that is, would have an effect on consumer purchase
decisions. See, e.g., William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, 66 F.3d 255 (9th Cir. 1995); See, e.g., Mary
LaFrance, Innovations Palpitations: The Confusing Status of Geographically Misdescriptive
Trademarks (2004) 12 JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 125; J. Thomas McCarthy,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 14:26-14:33 (4th ed. 2005), § 27:35). By comparison, I argue
that the NAFTA and TRIPS definitions of “geographic indication” fall somewhat short of requiring
materiality. Thus, in theory, the Lanham Act might not quite comply in this respect with NAFTA
and TRIPS standards, although this discrepancy could possibly be cured by judicial reinterpretation
of Section 43(a)(1)(B), since the materiality requirement is not stated explicitly in the language of
that provision. See In re California Innovations, Inc., 2002 WL 243562 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.,
Feb. 20, 2002). The California Innovations decision has resulted in a number of dramatic changes in
the legal analysis and treatment of geographic trademarks. Most notably, the decision creates a
category of geographically misdescriptive marks that are immediately registrable, while both
geographically descriptive marks, and marks that are descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in
ways unconnected with geography, still require secondary meaning to be registered upon the
Principal Register. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (authorizing a refusal to register a mark which “when
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively
misdescriptive of them”); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (authorizing a refusal to register a mark which
“when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically
descriptive of them”); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (providing that “[e]xcept as expressly excluded in [certain
subsections that do not include (e)(1) or (e)(2)], nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration
of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in
commerce.”). In 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that marks were only
“primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” when the misdescription materially affected
consumer purchasing decisions. That holding focused the geographic mark inquiry even more
narrowly on consumer protection from fraud rather than competition-promoting commercial
communication, and substantially enlarged the category of geographic brand names eligible for
immediate trade mark protection.
60 See infra.
61 The registration of GIs in Australia is not discussed in this article. The regulatory framework
that governs the Australian wine industry is centralized at a national level but comprises
collaborative efforts between government bodies such as the Australian Grape and Wine Authority
(AGWA) and wine industry associations such as the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA)
(see Figure 2): The AGWA comprises both the Grape and Wine Research and Development
Corporation and the Wine Australia Corporation (see Figure 1). Administrators of international
obligations and arrangements pursuant to bilateral treaties, include Australia, the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Independent organizations such as the OIV and World Wine Trade Group, also
facilitate effective administration of wine laws and related obligations associated with the supply of
wine. Gary Edmond, Disorder with Law: Determining the Geographical Indication for the
Coonawarra Wine Region 27 ADELAIDE L. REV. 59, 103-04 (2006). See also Administrative Appeals
Tribunal (AAT) (2001). Nos. S200/182, 183, 186–227, 305 and 313, Decision and Reasons for
Decision, Adelaide, October 2001. Classification and administration of GIs is pursuant to the
Australian Grape and Wine Authority Act 2013 (Cth) (AGWA Act), and the Australian Grape and
Wine Authority Regulations 1981 (Cth) (Australian Wine Regulations). Region classifications, GI
boundary determination, and the Label Integrity Program (LIP) are all administered by Wine
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have been used in Australia at least since the 1860s, the use of registered GIs
commenced at the beginning of the 1990s – when the AWBC Act was changed to
63
enable Australia to comply with the EC-Australia Agreement.
It is also a
64
requirement to include an accurate description of a wine’s origin on its label. A
wine’s origin, in this narrower context, is its GI.
Section 4 of the Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth) defines a GI:
“geographical indication”, in relation to wine goods, means an indication
that identifies the goods as originating in a country, or in a region or
locality in that country, where a given quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the goods is essentially attributable to their geographical
origin.65
An indication that identifies the goods as “originating” in a country, or in a
region or locality in that region is narrower than the former reference to “indicate the
country, region or locality . . .” in § 4 of the AWBC Act (repealed) and suggests

Australia: Australian Grape and Wine Authority Act 2013 (Cth); Wine Authority Regulations 1981
(Cth). Europe’s influence on the regulation of the Australian wine industry became clear in the early
1990s. In 1993, the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Act 1980 (Cth) was amended by the
Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Amendment Act 1993 (Cth) (the 1993 amendments). The
1993 amendments introduced provisions establishing the Geographical Indications Committee (GIC)
to determine GIs in relation to regions and localities in Australia. The precipitation of a more formal
and centrally regulated framework regulating the wine industry in Victoria appears to have been
born from the motivation of trade relations between Australia and the EU. The purpose of the 1993
amendments was to enable an agreement between Australia and the European Community to enter
into force (the EC-Australia Agreement).
62 See Thomson v B Seppelt and Sons Limited [1925] HCA 40.
63 Agreement between the European Community and Australia on Trade in Wine [1994] OJ L
86/94, superseded by the Agreement between the European Community and Australia on Trade in
Wine [2009] OJ L28/3 (entered into force 1 September 2010) (EC-Australia Wine Agreement or ECAustralia Agreement). Although this Agreement was principally aimed at protecting European GIs
in Australia, Australia needed to register its own GIs to protect them in Europe, but principally
increase wine exports. Unlike the system in France (i.e. AOC), Australia adopted a least intrusive
regulatory system that met the minimum requirements of the agreement, to enable continued access
to European markets: Gary Edmond, ‘Disorder with Law: Determining the Geographical Indication
for the Coonawarra Wine Region’ (2006) 27 Adelaide Law Review 59, 103-4. See also Administrative
Appeals Tribunal (AAT) (2001). Nos. S200/182, 183, 186–227, 305 and 313, Decision and Reasons for
Decision, Adelaide, October 2001.
64 Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth) pt. VIB (Protection of geographical indications and other
terms); s. 40D(2) (False descriptions and presentations); s. 40DA (Circumstances in which
description and presentation is not false – general).
65 Compare, § 4 of the AWBC Act (repealed) was much broader, and defined “geographical
indication”, in relation to wine, as:
(a) a word or expression used in the description and presentation of the wine to
indicate the country, region or locality in which the wine originated (emphasis
added); or
(b) a word or expression used in the description and presentation of the wine to
suggest that a particular quality, reputation or characteristic of the wine is
attributable to the wine having originated in the country, region or locality
indicated by the word…
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preference towards a more focused GI system. First, the word or expression used as
the identifying name for the region or location and, second, the geographical area
which constitutes the region or locality. This is reinforced by § 5D(b) which provides
that, for the purposes of the Act, a wine is taken to have originated in a particular
region or locality of Australia only if the wine is made from grapes grown in that
region or locality.
It follows from Article 2 that under the EC-Australia Agreement, a GI
designates a geographical area to which the quality, reputation or other
67
characteristic of the wine is essentially attributable. When then is a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of a good “essentially attributable” to their
geographic origin? On a broad interpretation, this may permit the use of “Australia”
or “Made in Australia” as an expression capable of amounting to a GI under the§ 4
definition. Taking this one step further, those seeking to use a generic term such as
Australia, or Victoria – provided that it identifies those goods as originating in that
country – would be permissible for the purposes of GI classification. If so, then it
could see toponyms instead recognized as a GI and formal recognition of “rejected”
trademarks because it is a general geographic term under the GI system.
Conflicting Regimes?
The Australian trademark system and the GI system operate parallel to each
68
other. Priority, exclusivity, and territoriality are the guiding principles for the
66 Interpretation of the Act is to be cast in light of objectives of the Act. Part VIB (§§ 40, 40A40ZF), for example, was introduced by the 1993 amendments. Section 40A provides:
“The object of this Part is to regulate the sale, export and import of wine:
(a) for the purpose of enabling Australia to fulfill its obligations under prescribed
wine-trading agreements and other international agreements; and
(b) for certain other purposes for which the Parliament has power to make laws;
and this Part is to be interpreted and administered accordingly.”
It is an express requirement of the object clauses in both § 3 and § 40A, that the Act be
interpreted and administered to fulfil Australia’s obligations under, inter alia, the EC-Australia
Wine Agreement. Australia’s obligations under the Agreement are, therefore, not merely relevant as
an aid to interpretation in the event of ambiguity in the language of the statute. Compare, e.g.
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287. Reference to “…and
other international agreements” in § 40A(a) was previously omitted in the 1993 amendments.
Inclusion of this appears to recognize the relevance of free trade agreements (FTAs), the importance
of agriculture in Australia, and the relevance of the wine industry from an economic perspective: See
Anthony Battaglene, Winemakers’ Federation of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4
February 2016, 1-2.
67 This is reflected in section 3 of the AGWA Act, setting out the objects of the Act which are:
(a) to support grape or wine research and development activities; and
(b) to control the export of grape products from Australia; and
(c) to promote the consumption and sale of grape products, both in Australia
and overseas; and
(d) to enable Australia to fulfil its obligations under prescribed wine-trading
agreements and other international agreements.”
Compare, e.g., AWBC Act s 3 (repealed) (which contained greater detail).
68 See, e.g., Beringer Blass Wine Estates Limited v Geographical Indications Committee (2002)
125 FCR 155. See also Beringer Blass Wine Estates Limited v Geographical Indications Committee
[2002] FCAFC 295. For an explanation of the trade mark and GI conflict in this case, see Stephen
Stern, The Overlap between Geographical Indications and Trade Marks in Australia 2 MELBOURNE
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conflict between trade marks and GIs.
Despite there being two separate
70
administering bodies, the GI system contains important parameters for use of GIs
in trade marks. For example, new GIs are capable of being determined and entered
71
on the GI Register even if a mark is registered in respect of all or part of the GI.
Also, the Australian Wine Act 2013 (Cth) and Regulations allow for the co-existence
of Australian GIs and trademarks registered or applied for prior to the registration of
the GI. It is unclear to what extent existing trademark owners would lose exclusivity
of their trademark protection if a GI is successively registered in respect of all or part
72
of their mark. Article 16 (Rights Conferred) of TRIPS, which does not exclude the
possibility of a trademark owner excluding the protection of a later coming GI
(identical or similar) on condition that the GI is used or has been registered in bad
73
faith or that its use constitutes an act of unfair competition, could aid such inquiry.
This logic should equally transpose to GIs, since the use of GIs is the use of an
74
indication (encapsulated as a “sign”) in the course of trade.
With regards an attempt to register grape varieties as GIs, Winemakers
75
Federation of Australia v European Commission provides indicative guidance. In
that case, the Deputy Registrar upheld the objection made by the Winemakers
Federation of Australia (WFA) to the registration of the Prosecco GI on the basis that

J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); Miranda Ayu, How does Australia Regulate the Use of Geographical Indication
for Products other than Wines and Spirits? 3 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 1 (2006). See further Penola
High School v. Geographical Indications Committee [2001] AATA 844.
69 Daniel J. Gervais, Reinventing Lisbon: The Case for a Protocol to the Lisbon Agreement
(Geographical Indications) 11 CHINA J. INTERNATIONAL L. 67, 96 (2010). See also Daniel J. Gervais,
The Lisbon Agreement’s misunderstood potential 1 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 87, 98 (2009). See
also Mihály Ficsor, Challenges to the Lisbon System, WIPO/GEO/LIS/08/4 (Oct. 31, 2008), at [19].
Arts. 5(3) and Rule 9(2)(ii) require an indication of the grounds for a declaration of refusal if the
competent authority of the contracting country declares that it cannot ensure the protection of an
appellation of origin whose international registration has been notified to it, but neither the
Agreement, nor the Regulations specify the grounds on which a declaration of refusal can be based.
It happens in practice, and thus it seems broadly accepted, that an internationally registered
appellation of origin is, and can be, denied protection in a contracting country to the Lisbon
Agreement because existing prior rights would conflict with that appellation.
70 The GI system is administered by Wine Australia pursuant to the Wine Australia Act 2013
(Cth), whereas the trade mark regime is administered by IP Australia pursuant to the Trade Marks
Act 1995 (Cth). Despite these two separate administering bodies, the GI system contains important
parameters for use of GIs in trademarks. Sarah Hinchliffe, When Place Names Are Worth Bottling,
82(9) L. INST. J., 44-46 (2008).
71 Owners of registered and unregistered trade marks in Australia can however object on
numerous grounds to the determination of a proposed GI. Notices of proposed GI determinations
need to be published by the Geographical Indications Committee (GIC) to allow objections to be
made by persons who will be aggrieved by such determination. Objections can be made on similar
grounds to objections to trade mark applications (e.g., that the proposed GI is likely to cause
confusion). An appeal process is set out in the Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth) and are brought in the
Federal Court of Australia.
72 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS ].
73 The objectives of s. 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), and § 33(b)(5) of the U.S.
Trademark Act could aid this inquiry.
74 TRIPS Art. 16
75 [2013] ATMOGI 1 [hereinafter the Prosecco Case].
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it had “established use [by Australian producers of Prosecco] where on its face the
76
clear meaning of the term is as a variety of grapes”.
Taking into account Australia’s migrant history on questions of confusion and
77
recognition of foreign language terms (amongst other factors), the Deputy Registrar
noted the widespread use of the term Prosecco as the name of a grape variety at the
78
time the name was first used in Australia. In refusing to exercise his (broad)
discretion to direct the GIC to consider the Prosecco GI application, the Deputy
Register further noted that that the effect of registering the Prosecco GI would be to
prevent producers from continuing to use Prosecco as the name of a grape variety –
79
which is exactly the mischief that the Act is designed to avoid.
The decision echoed the broad discretion of the Registrar in such matters, and
that (in making an assessment) a number of factors otherwise not limited to factors
going to the inconvenience of the parties or to the “first in time” principle, will be
80
considered. Such discretion could be construed as taking into account other
commercial considerations, including possible quantifiable economic impact on firms
should they be prevented from continuing use of a term.
3. Innovation in Branding?
This section explained regulatory requirements with regards contents of labels,
and highlighted that there is scope (at least in the case of the US) in what is
considered reference to origin and which may assist a [New World] US wine firm to
carve out a market niche through a branding avenue. As such, the U.S. has
(generally speaking) adopted a more commercial view of what a wine’s source (insofar
as its geographic origin is concerned) may be. On the one hand, permitting a broad
approach to to determining an AVA, not to mention the potential for disregarding it
in considering an application to register a mark that makes geographical reference,
could be viewed as misleading. On the other, such an approach is not inconsistent
81
with the emphasis on the trademark regime, nor with the First Amendment to the
82
United States’ Constitution. The result being that there is greater scope for
innovation in branding.
Australia, by comparison, adopts a narrower approach to determining and use of
a wine’s source (insofar as its geographical origin or GI is concerned). In the absence
of a similar ‘free speech’ constitutional clause, and in light of Australia’s approach to
prohibiting misleading and/or deceiving consumers, it appears more unlikely than
not for a broad interpretation of ‘essentially attributable’ in determining what may be
classified as a GI. It is abundantly clear that reference to an Australian GI is only

Id.
Confusion worldwide as to whether Prosecco is a GI, a grape variety or a style of wine.
78 That Prosecco has been available as a variety name for use by Australian producers since
1994 (and is the only official name for that grape variety)
79 Since the term Prosecco was the only name that Australian producers were legally permitted
to use in respect of the relevant grape variety.
80 See Rothbury Wines Pty Ltd v Tyrell [2008] ATMOGI 1.
81 See infra below n. 83.
82 See infra below.
76
77
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capable of use if statutory requirements are met. In both jurisdictions, however,
there is scope for innovation in branding through other avenues – for example, the
trademark regime.
The next section adds to this discussion by highlighting the role of a brand in
consumer preference towards a wine product. It also identifies other factors that
influences consumer preference in purchasing a wine. The purpose is to identify
whether consumers value innovation in branding, how such value [of a brand] can be
measured, and whether the law does or is capable of reflecting the current trend.
B. Consumer Preference
84

There is a nexus between the wine market and consumer behaviour. As a
regulated consumption good, wine is heavily reliant on catering to the needs of
85
consumers. This is because consumers – as part of the decision-making process –
83 Australian Wine Act 2013 (Cth), s. 40N (establishment of the GIC); id. at s. 40P (outlining the
function of the GIC is to make determinations of GIs for wine in relation to regions and localities in
Australia, and it has power to do all things necessary and convenient in connection with such
function, including the ability to modify a region). See also, Beringer Blass Wine
Estates Limited v Geographical Indications Committee (2002) 125 FCR 155. See also Beringer Blass
Wine Estates Limited v Geographical Indications Committee [2002] FCAFC 295. Other sections of
Part VIB make provision for interested parties to apply to the GIC for the determination of a GI and
specify the procedural steps that the GIC must follow leading up to the making of a final
determination. The relevance of this provision may be viewed as diminished in light of the high
number of wine regions in Victoria. Id at s. 40T (outlines the Committee’s responsibility in
determining a GI). The Regulations are complementary, and provide guidelines for description and
presentation of wine, as well as the main principles of vine varieties’ distinction. Section 40T,
recognizing the separate objects stated in s. 3, imposes two requirements on the GIC. It is to identify
the boundary of the area or areas to which the determination relates, and it is to determine the
indication (formerly referred to as “word or expression” (i.e. the name)) to be used to indicate that
area or those areas. This dual function is to be borne in mind when considering Part 5 of the
Regulations to which s. 40T(2) refers. Part 5 of the Regulations is set out in Appendix D. The note to
reg. 25, which states that: “…[i]n determining a geographical indication under subsection 40Q(1) of
the Act, the Committee is not prohibited under the Act from having regard to any other relevant
matters” makes it clear that the list of prescribed criteria to which the Committee is to have regard
is not intended as an exhaustive list. The GIC may have regard to any other relevant matters: See
e.g. Beringer Blass Wine Estates Limited v Geographical Indications Committee (2002) 125 FCR 155.
However, the direction in reg. 25 requires that the GIC must have regard to each of the specified
criterion and “give weight to them as a fundamental element” in reaching its decision: See The
Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 333 (per Gibbs CJ)
(explaining that soil and soil science are examples of matters which in the present case all parties
have treated as other relevant matters to which regard should be had.)
84 VIJAY RAMASWAMY AND SARMA NAMAKUMARI, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: PLANNING,
CONTROL, (MacMillan, 1990) 52 (discussing The Nicosia Model of consumer behaviour. This Model
builds buyer behaviour models from a marketing perspective, establishes the link between a firm
and its customers, how the activities of the firm influence the consumer and results in a buying
decision. It regards that information from the firm influences consumer preference of the product,
resulting in a consumer developing a certain attitude towards the product causing him to search or
evaluate about the product. If these steps have a positive impact, it may result in a decision to buy).
85 See David Aaker, Measuring Brand Equity Across Product and Markets, 38(3) CALIFORNIA
MANAGEMENT REV. 102, 110-2 (1996) (providing that brand awareness and brand perceived quality
as the significant factors to create and maintain brand equity. There is positive relationship among
brand awareness, perceive quality and brand equity).
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rely both on information, and the way that it is portrayed. Explaining the broader
economic dimensions of IP can shed light on: (i) the role that effective information
channels; (ii) with regards consumer decision making; and (ii) the value of that
information (e.g. through branding, or use of GIs, etc).
1. Normative inquiry into information channels that are effective
Intellectual property (IP), while not an overt source of information, can embody
information through which is communicated to a user or consumer through the above
sources of information. For example, a primary objective of the trademark regime is
to inform consumers about the origin of a mark (but with a focus on identification of
the manufacturing unit), and with a view to minimise search costs. Courts in the US
will enforce a trademark owner’s right to exclusive use of the trademark within an
87
area of commerce to protect this source-identifying function.
A GI similarly seeks to attribute association between a product (or a method) to
88
the unique or natural qualities of particular region or geographical origin. In a
technical sense, a GI effectively comprises two type of indications of geographical
89
origin (IGOs): namely appellations of origin (AOC), and indications of origin. But,
the information is collective – i.e. a geographical origin.
Both GIs and trademarks are therefore capable of representing information
90
about the origin of a product. From a normative perspective, classifying the type of
good that a wine product is aids the inquiry of what effective information channels
are.
There are three identified categories of goods: search goods, experience goods,
and credence goods. An experience good is classified as such where consumers tend to
prefer to purchase them and assess quality through use and experience; the latter
91
then guiding future choice. Credence goods are those goods where neither prior
inspection nor subsequent use is sufficient for developing a robust notion of quality.

86 See Hinchliffe supra n. 10 at 6.3.1 (case study and study of consumer preference of New
World versus Old World wine).
87 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). One such advantage is that registration allows for nationwide
protection of a trademark, while unregistered marks may only be protectable in the limited area
where they are used: see ide. § 1057(c), § 1115(b)(5). Section 1115(b)(5) protects individuals that
used a mark in a limited geographic area prior to the registration of the same mark by another
individual. Id. The unregistered prior user may continue to use the mark but must only use it within
the limited geographic area they operated in prior to the mark being registered. The benefits of
registration are significant enough that most trademark owners engaging in interstate commerce
seek to register their marks, which is accomplished by applying to the USPTO: Id. at § 1051. There
are, however, limits upon what types of marks may be federally registered: Id. at § 1052.
88 The term GI comprises two types of IGOs, namely appellations of origin (which corresponds to
legal definition of the Lisbon Agreement) and indications of origin, which corresponds to the legal
definition of GIs definition under Art. 22(1) of TRIPS.
89 IGOs have been regarded as one of the earliest types of trade mark used by traders as a
means to exploit local reputation through the use of distinctive signs to evoke a particular
geographical origin.
90 For a discussion about normative reasons for classifying GIs as an IP right, see: Hinchliffe
supra n 10 (stating also that, by virtue of their inclusion in TRIPS, are both regarded as IP rights)
91 See also Ramaswamy and Namakumari, supra n. 84, 53.
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92

Wine products exhibit all three attributes. Although, wine may be described as
search goods if consumers can develop a robust notion of the quality prior to purchase
93
through either inspection and/or research.
Each category refers to the term
94
‘quality’ which, as alluded to, can be subjective for wine. Reference to ‘quality’ is
better understood in the case of wine to mean ‘value’ to a consumer – the goal being
that there will be positive reputation of a wine if consumers value the product higher
95
than others in that class.
When faced with choices in a market, information about a product enable
consumers to make informed and educated decisions. Information can be portrayed
to, and thereby sourced by, consumers in a number of ways: previous experience,
friends and family, public advisory bureaus and advertisement. A consumer may
draw on any one of these sources to assess the comparative trustworthiness of
96
potential sellers or suppliers of goods. The information type, and the way in which
information is portrayed are maximized if it results in lower search costs to a
consumer.
The reason that information matters is because consumers are ultimately the
drivers of demand for wine. Making an informed decision about product choice
requires having access to information about products in the market. For a regulatory
framework to facilitate reduction of search costs, it is necessary to identify what
drives the decision preference. Since wine is a regulated commodity that is largely
dependent on consumer demand, such inquiries are important considerations for
legislatures with a view, in so doing, to support the long-term sustainability of the
wine industry. Long-term economic sustainability includes supporting the wine
industry in protecting their investments through building reputation of the industry
and linking that reputation to a ‘brand’ (a communal brand, or a private brand) in a
commercially competitive environment. Regulators, it is posited, can facilitate this
through protecting the information channel role of an IP regime.
2. What information Matters to a Consumer?
An examination of factors that influence a consumer’s decision to purchase wine
is outlined below. It identifies the role that intellectual property plays in this
decision-making process, and opportunities for the wine industry to utilize IP
regimes to better market their product.
92 See Dwijen Rangnekar, Demanding Stronger Protection for Geographical Indications: The
Relationship between Local Knowledge, Information and Reputation (Discussion Paper Series,
United Nations University, April 2004) 25.
93 Philip Nelson, ‘Information and consumer behaviour’ (1970) 78 (March-April) Journal of
Political Economy 27, 31.
94 See supra n. 4.
95 Channelling information through the use of IP regimes in light of wine’s classification of a
multi-dimensional good to evoke a positive value and thus higher reputation of a wine product is an
ideal objective for both the industry and consumer, alike. At present, regimes have a different
preference to which IP regime represents rights and interests of these stakeholders. Regimes also
lack uniformity in how information is portrayed (i.e. through labelling laws, or lack thereof), and
administering consumer protection laws.
96 See Stigler, above, 219, reprinted in D. Lamberton (ed) The Economics of Information,
Penguin, 1970. See Ramaswamy and Namakumari, supra n 84, 52.
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Quality and Price
Marketing and economics literature indicates that price and quality play a role
in influencing consumer preference for wine.
97
Almenberg and Dreber, for example, measured the impact of price on consumer
satisfaction, and found that there is significant bias due to price information during
blind wine tastings. They also noted that the price biases were larger when a
consumer received price information about an expensive wine in comparison with a
cheap wine and that the biases are more prevalent in women than in men. They also
found that these biases were larger if the consumers were informed of the price
points before they tasted the wine in comparison to after they tasted the wine, but
before they assigned the rating.
Insofar as quality of a wine plays a role in consumer decision-making, there is
98
consideration of wine oenology. Since the quality of wine (from an oenological
perspective) is bias, measuring bias that consumers may have about wines made
from hybrid grape varieties is less clear. A study by Cuellar and Huffman
incorporated wine sales to measure the price and income elasticity of numerous wine
99
varietals. They found statistically significant positive income elasticities for wines
made from grapes such as Pinot Noir, Pinot Gris, and Chardonnay, while wines made
from lesser known varietals, such as Chenin Blanc and Malbec, did not have
statistically significant income elasticities. The difference in the income elasticities of
different wine varietals introduces the idea of a potential bias relating to grape
varietal composition of wines. Although not discussed in their research, the
measurement of the possible bias against wines made from hybrid grapes, which
often have lesser-known names and a shorter history of use for winemaking warrants
100
future inquiry.
Taking price and quality out of the equation (or assuming that price and
perceived quality of wine is equal), existing research shows that a consumer will look
to indicators of source and the ‘pizzazz’ effect of a wine label.
Source of Origin
Origin of a product alone does not necessarily increase the value of a wine
product. This is because the wine industry is an imperfect market because of the high
101
level of information asymmetry on the quality of marketed wine products.
97 Johan Almenberg and Anna Dreber, When Does the Price Affect the Taste? Results From a
Wine, 6(1) J. WINE ECON. 111, 117-8 (2011).
98 Consortium is one way of overcoming this knowledge gap, but is not discussed in the present
article; see: Sarah Hinchliffe supra n. 10.
99 Steven Cuellar and Ryan Huffman, ‘Estimating the Demand for Wine Using Instrumental
Variable Techniques’ American Association of Wine Economists Working Paper No. 24 Economics
(2008).
100 See Sarah Hinchliffe, supra n. 10. This study will test for bias that consumers may have
against wines made from hybrid grapes, while controlling for factors such as education, wine
preferences, presence of formal wine training, age, and amount typically spent on a bottle of wine.
101 See e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84(3) Q. J. ECON. 488, 499-500 (1970) (who works up to the research conducted by
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Perception of quality is also intertwined with information of a product – the
value that a consumer sees in the authenticity of a wine region stems from the
available information of a product. The greater the information, the higher the
perception of quality. As noted by Fisk:
Attribution has a commodity value distinct from the value of the
intellectual property or human capital to which it is attached. The
commodity value of credit is entirely informational: it tells consumers,
current and prospective employers, creators, and the world at large about
products and their creators. The commodity value of credit and blame is
dissipated if the right to it is transferred because the information is lost.
Attribution is a type of signal...102
In a commodity-driven world where ignorance of a wine region counts negatively
for a firm using a GI, but attribution or association holds a distinguishing quality
that, in conjunction with a mark, conveys meaning to consumers, the weight of
103
whether: “the mark identify the geographic origin of the goods or services?”
may
not be so significant. In this sense, trademarks, once exported from a particular
104
social, economic, and political context, signify a much more elastic kind of origin.
“Origin” is firm-level as opposed to collective. It is in theory more difficult for an
individual firm to stand-out amongst other competitors in a dense market such as
wine. The law should therefore not inhibit innovation in an initial point of
105
information–a wine label.
Set against this are results from a study of how consumers perceive wine labels
revealing that:
•

Middle-aged participants tend to pay less attention to label uniqueness
than other age groups did, and they do not perceive it as an indicator of
106
quality.

Grossman and Shapiro, regarding analyses of information-asymmetrical markets, generally)). See
Gene Grossman and Carl Shapiro, Counterfeit-product trade, 78(1) AMER. ECON. REV. 59, 63 (1988).
102 Catherine Fisk, ‘Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution’ (2006) 95
Geology Law Journal 49, 54.
103 Robert Tinlot and Y Juban, ‘Différents systèmes d’indications géographiques et appellations
d’origine. Leurs relations avec l’harmonisation internationale’ (1998) Bulletin de l’OIV, 811-812: 773799.
104 See Thomas Drescher, ‘The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks – From Signals to
Symbols to Myth’ (2001) 82 Trademark Reporter 301, 301, outlining that the mark “Coca-Cola” in
Johannesburg, Tokyo, or Beijing surely does not signify origin in a trade mark sense in those
countries. Instead, what it might signify is American, which in turn could be short form for status,
class, or membership in a group. Consumers wanting to capture a taste of American culture or an
association with the imagery of life in the US may choose McDonald’s, Coke, or Pizza Hut for all
these reasons.
105 See also Sarah Hinchliffe, supra n. 10 (discussing the disbenefit of a GI regime, and saying
that “…in the context of wine, if a wine from the New World lacks qualities that may only be
recognised as particular to that region or terroir, then a GI system (viewed in a narrow sense) seems
superfluous).
106 See also M. Wolf and S. Thomas, ‘How Millennial, Generation X, and Baby Boomer Wine
Consumers Evaluate Wine Labels’ (2007), 38 Journal of Food Distribution Research 1, 17.
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Millennial category of consumers (who have been “gaining ground for the
past decade” rely less on geographical indications such as region of origin
to determine wine quality and pay more attention to the label’s
107
attractiveness and alcohol content.

In another study undertaken by the EU Commission revealed a positive
association between geographical specialisation and a protected IGO. That study
108
showed that consumers are willing to pay extra (or a premium) for GI products.
The results of that study indicate that there is also an economic incentive for the
value of a GI, as findings have shown that EU GI products were sold at a price 2.75
109
times higher than that of a similar quantity non-GI product. The limitation of that
study, however, was its limited study of Old World GIs only.
110
Other preferences and factors include environmental sustainability, reference
111
to an organic wine;
also characteristics of wine like wine type, brand name,

107 Thomas Atkin and Liz Thach, ‘Millennial Wine Consumers: Risk Perception and Information
Research’ (2012) 1(1) Wine Economics and Policy 54, 57.
108 See Tanguy Chever, Christian Renault, Séverine Renault, Violaine Romieu, Value of
production of agricultural products and foodstuffs, wines, aromatised wines and spirits protected by
a geographical indication (GI) (Final Report, October 2012) at 3. The definition of “value premium
rate” of this study may be described as: Premium = (GI volume×GI price)/ (GI volume × non-GI
price), where the premium for wines across the EU was estimated at 2.75 ((where “premium” is
defined as the ratio between the price of a GI product and the price of the corresponding non-GI
product).
109 See id. See also Rangnekar, above n. 92, 31 (Rangnekar’s discussion on regional
specialisation within product categories similarly reflects this positive correlation on IGOs. He
identifies that this geographical specialisation is also apparent at lower levels of product
aggregation. For example, he identifies that, despite widespread distributions (internationally and
within nations) of the species Vitis Vinifera, the major protection areas are highly localised and, in
some instances, the grape variety has its own distinctive geographic pattern. In explaining this
pattern, Rangenekar noted that relevance of local knowledge, the cultural and economic processes
through which these come to be in the known and reputable. For geographers, he noted that the
organising analytical category is terroir, and that: “the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions
and interactions (of people, things and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control
over a geographic area.”); See also Christopher Ray, Culture, intellectual property and territorial
rural development, (1998) 38(1) Sociologia Ruralis 3, 3-4.
110 Trends also appear to influence consumers’ choice of wine. Environmental sustainability, for
example, has been making slow but steady gains in societal recognition for the past several years.
As a result, an increasing number of wine producers, retailers, and consumers include sustainability
in their considerations when it comes to the evaluation wine products: Jacob Clinite, ‘The
Preferences in Wine of Various Aged Consumers’ (March 2013) http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/.
A growing number of companies use environmental strategies to advance technologically, innovate,
and build competitive advantage: Daniel Esty and Andrew Winston, Green to Gold: How Smart
Companies Use Environmental Strategy to Innovate, Create Value, and Build Competitive Advantage
(John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 45-6. Sustainable actions are therefore considered to be increasingly
profitable and valuable in reinforcing the brand and market positioning, as more and more
consumers choose to buy ecologically-friendly products: Sharon L Forbes and Tracy-Anne De Silva,
‘Analysis of environmental management systems in New Zealand wineries’ (2012) 24(2)
International Journal of Wine Business Research 98, 110 Australia, for instance, is one of the
countries that place a particular emphasis on business and environmental sustainability at both
national and individual winery levels: Enterprising Partnerships Pty Ltd., ‘Emerging Themes. Wine
Industry Australia’ Prepared for the Future Leaders – Succession for the Australian Wine Sector,
2007.
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vintage, alcohol content, price, and flavour. Consumer demographics, in their turn,
consist of gender, culture, age, economic status, income, education, marital status,
living location, and having children. A discussion of these factors are, however
beyond the scope of this article.
3. Take-Aways
Origin of a product, therefore, alone does not necessarily increase the value of a
product. This is because the wine industry is an imperfect market because of the high
112
level of information asymmetry on the quality of marketed wine products.
It can
be gleaned from the above that:
•
•

Information about the specific geographical source of a New World wine
is not a fore priority to a consumer;
Given a comparable New World wine of similar price and similar quality,
consumers migrate towards a label with pizzazz branding (i.e. branding
preference). Whether that be color of a wine label, picture and/or brand
name (e.g. Yellowtail).

Millennials are the consumer base for wine products going forward and, as such,
a plethora of opportunities in an already dense global market for innovative branding
(emphasizing unique branding features other than those geographic origin
indicators) to cater towards this branding preference exists. One such avenue may be
113
daring marks that fall short of scandalous or disparaging marks.
C. Opportunities to Bridge Practical Reality and Law
In the case of infrequently purchased experience goods such as wine, a buyer (as
mentioned) uses multiple sources of information (e.g. friends, family, advertisements,
111 Health and wellness trend is another factor that determines the customers’ demand for wine.
Due to the increasing public attention towards the healthy lifestyles, health concerns are growing
among consumers, which results in changing preferences toward healthier foods and beverages:
Lindsey M Higgins and Erica Llanos, ‘A Healthy Indulgence? Wine Consumers and the Health
Benefits of Wine’ (2015) 4 Wine Economics and Policy 1, 3-11. Contemporary consumers expect
wines to be healthful and produced with the help of environmentally sustainable techniques.
Although health conscious consumers may be difficult to reach, as they are selective concerning
their alcohol decisions, knowing their health considerations may increase opportunities for
presenting wine as a healthy beverage: id. Thus, ongoing health-consciousness induced some wine
producers to focus on “organic” wine that presumably causes less harm to customers’ health, as well
as promote civilised drinking as a healthy alternative to binge drinking. Traditional winemaking
countries like France still maintain that consuming red wine in a moderate quantity not only
strengthens the cardiovascular system, but also increases lifespan due to the natural phenol called
resveratrol found in red wine: Betul Catalgol et al., ‘Resveratrol: French paradox revisited’ (2012) 3
Frontiers in Pharmacology 141, 142.
112 See e.g. Akerlof’s, supra n. 101 (who works up to the research conducted by Grossman and
Shapiro supra n 101, regarding analyses of information-asymmetrical markets, generally)).
113 See infra below.
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labels) to generate a perception of that wine product.
Where consumers seek out a
brand such as a trademark, they do so because a mark acts as a signaling device that
115
identifies a particular winery’s product.
To achieve the economies in “search”–by
being an efficient information channel – a trademark must meet certain
116
conditions. The law in both the US and Australia is sufficiently flexible to permit
marks that have a ‘pop’ or ‘pizzazz’ factor. This section discusses opportunities in the
law to facilitate innovation in branding opportunities for the wine industry.
1. Innovation through Registration of a funky mark – Australia
Innovation is important for the purposes of appealing to a consumer. But, what
is considered permissible to be registered as a mark can curb this–at least insofar as
a wine trademark is considered scandalous. There is tremendous leniency in this. In
the US, this is due to the First Amendment; and, in Australia, for cultural reasons.
Under section 42(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), a trademark application
must be rejected if “the trade mark contains or consists of scandalous matter”, and by
virtue of section 57, a ground of opposition. A trademark is considered scandalous, or
its use contrary to law if:
(a) The trade mark contains or consists of scandalous matter;
(b) Its use would be contrary to law.

117

or

Neither the Act nor its corresponding regulations define the term “scandalous”
for the purposes of section 42(a). Although the legislation does not define the term
“scandalous”, case law has set a relatively high threshold for determining that a
118
mark is “scandalous”.
Section 2.2 of the ATMO Manual states that the Registrar
must decide what may be considered “scandalous”, albeit with very little support
119
from the courts or other decision makers.
For a trademark to be “scandalous”
under s 42(a), it must have an “obvious and up front” scandalous element, rather

114 This article does not discuss the element of reputation and value. But, see: Sarah Hinchliffe
supra note 10.
115 Economides’s implies that “unobservable qualities” may be subjective in nature and
therefore difficult to regulate: Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks 78
TRADEMARK REPORTER 523, 526 (1988). But, he does identify a nexus between the “value” to
consumers of “unobservable features”, and therefore that a consumer’s positive perception of value is
linked to reputation. Such reputation may be of the product, the region, or a private firm. It does
this through protection of the investments undertaken to develop brand names, and second the
associated reputation and safeguard the role of trade marks as information channels between buyer
and seller: There are limits to this potential for retaliation in today’s corporate world because of the
diffused ownership pattern within the corporate sector: see Akerlof, supra n. 101 499-500. See also
William Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark law: an economic perspective, 30(2) J. L. &
ECON. 265, 292-3 (1987).
116 See Sarah Hinchliffe supra n. 10, Part VI.
117 Australia has a registration system for trademarks, which has been in place since the 19th
century. Australian law prohibits the registration of “scandalous” trademarks, but lacks detailed or
conclusive guidance on what will be deemed “scandalous”.
118 See infra below.
119 See La Marquise Footwear, Inc’s Application (1947), 64 RPC 27 at 30 (per Evershed J).
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than a mere suggestion or a vague possibility that the mark may be offensive in some
circumstances.
In practice, therefore, trademarks in Australia are rarely refused registration on
120
the grounds that they comprise or contain scandalous matter.
Consider the
following wine names in Figure 5.
Trademarks containing or consisting of scandalous matter have broadly
121
described as being able to be divided into seven possible categories:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

122

Those with religious nexus;
123
Those consisting of or comprising racial slurs or epithets;
124
Those consisting of or comprising profane matter;
125
Those consisting of or comprising vulgar matter;
126
Those relating to sexuality;
Those involving innuendo;
127
Those suggesting or promoting illegal activity.

Grounds for rejection would require something beyond the giving of offence, and
that the mark should exhibit a probability, rather than a possibility, that it would
cause a significant degree of “disgrace, shock or outrage” when used in its intended
128
context.
One take on this was made by the deciding officer in Hallelujah

120 See, e.g., ‘Hallelujah’ Trade Mark [1976] RPC 605; Maglifico Calzificio Torinese SpA’s
Application (1982) AOJP 1764. See also, Re Registered Trade Mark No 2184549 in the name of
French Connection Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 438 [hereinafter the “FCUK case”] (Regarding the invalidity
on the ground that a mark was ‘contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality’ under
(UK) Trade Marks Act 1994 s 3(3)(a). In that case, there was an unsuccessful challenge to
registration of the mark “FCUK”; outrage or censure among an identifiable section of the public had
not been proved).
121 Re Peter Hanlon [2011] ATMO 45 at [14] citing Stephen R Baird, Moral Intervention in the
Trademark Arena: Barring the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks (1993) 83 TMR
661, 704 (which considered cases in the United States).
122 See, e.g., Mercy’s Application (1955) 25 AOJP 938; Maglificio Calizificio Torinese SpA’s App
(1982) 37 AOJP 1764; “Hallelujah” Trade Mark [1976] RPC 605 (UK) [hereinafter, “Hallelujah”
case].
123 See, e.g., Re Peter Hanlon [2011] ATMO 45.
124 See, e.g., Die Hard Pty Ltd [1995] ATMO 26; FCUK Trade Mark [2007] RPC 1 (UK).
125 See, e.g., Kuntstreetwear Pty Ltd’s Trade Mark Application (2007) 73 IPR 438.
126 See, e.g., Die Hard Proprietary Ltd. [1995] ATMO 26; Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Ass’n
Found. v. Fanni Barns Proprietary Ltd. [2003] ATMO 10; La Marquise Footwear Inc.’s Application
(1947) 64 R.P.C. 27 (UK); Ghazilian’s Trade Mark Application [2002] R.P.C. 33 (UK); FCUK Trade
Mark [2007] R.P.C. 1 (UK). On analogous issues in UK designs law, see also Masterman’s Design
Application [1991] R.P.C. 89 (UK).
127 See, e.g., Re Peter Hanlon [2011] ATMO 45 at [42] (in the context of racial vili8fcation and
assault).
128 Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Ass’n Found. v. Fanni Barns Proprietary Ltd. (2003) 57
IPR 594; (2003) AIPC at [91-871]; [2003] ATMO 10 (dictionary definitions of ‘scandalous’ discussed,
effect of Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 33 at id. s 42(a) analysed); Re. Peter Hanlon [2011] ATMO 45
at [15].
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129

Trademark,
who referred to the test as being one that is “contrary to morality”
130
rather than “scandalous”.
Marks that are crude or in poor taste will not necessarily be considered
“scandalous”. For example, the mark LOOK GOOD + FEEL GOOD = ROOT GOOD
was held not to be scandalous, although it was arguably “crude”, “explicit” and in
131
“bad taste”.
However, the mark KUNT was refused registration, due to its obvious
visual and phonetic similarity with another English word. More recently, the
trademarks NUCKIN FUTS and POMMIEBASHER were granted registration by the
ATMO. The trademark NUCKIN FUTS, which was advertised for registration in
July 2012, is protected in respect of goods including prepared nuts and potato crisps.
The NUCKIN FUTS mark presumably overcame any section 42(a) objection as it
does not contain an obvious, “up front” scandalous element, but rather a subtler play
132
on words.
The threshold for rejecting a trademark application under s 42(a) of the Act is
relatively high. The rationale behind the ability to potentially register marks not
considered scandalous but deemed crude or in bad taste (such NUCKIN FUTS and
133
POMMIEBASHER) is, in part, as a result of cultural influences.
Australia’s
cultural heritage is derived from the United Kingdom, but also captures indigenous
134
culture. Reference to “Bong-Bong” may, for example, refer to a place in Australia.
HALLELUJAH Trade Mark [1976] R.P.C. 605 (UK).
Id. at 607: “I conclude that the phrase “contrary to morality” falls to be considered by the
generally accepted standards of today and not by those of 1938. The difficulty is to be sure what
those are, and more particularly, where the line is to be drawn between marks whose registration is
prohibited by the section and those where it is not. When religious and moral standards are
changing, sometimes quite rapidly, it seems to me that the Registrar should only follow where
others have given a clear lead. While he must not remain isolated from the day-to-day world, frozen
in an outmoded set of moral principles, he must equally not presume to set the standard. He must
certainly not act as a censor or arbiter of morals, nor yet as a trendsetter. He must not lag so far
behind the climate of the time that he appears to be out of touch with reality, but he must at the
same time not be so insensitive to public opinion that he accepts for registration a mark which many
people would consider offensive.”
131 Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Ass’n Found. v. Fanni Barns Proprietary Ltd. (2003) 57
IPR 594; Kuntstreetwear Proprietary Ltd.’s Trade Mark Application (2007) 73 IPR 438; Re
POMMIEBASHER [2011] ATMO 45.
132 See generally, Sydney, CNN TRAVEL (Date Acessed), http://travel.cnn.com/sydney/visit/10most-ridiculous-place-names-australia-515758.
133 See, e.g. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 Oct. 2006,
No.
15
(AUSTL.),
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/2006-1019/toc_pdf/5044-3.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chamber/hansardr/2006-1019/0000%22.
134 See Sarah Hinchliffe, Overlap Between Trademarks and Geographical Indications in
Australia, 21 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL.147-149 (2009) (outlining that a trademark formed wholly by a
geographical name (e.g. Adelaide), or a trademark which primarily consists of a geographical name
having additional descriptive terms in relation to the specific goods and services that trademark
intends to represent (e.g. “Adelaide Plumbing Service” to represent a plumbing service in Adelaide),
will be objected to by a Trade Mark Examiner during the examination phase of an application for
trademark registration in Australia, pursuant to s 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, as being not
inherently adapted for distinguishing the goods or services supplied or provided by the applicant
from the specific goods or services supplied or provided by other traders. In some special cases, an
application for registration of such a trademark may also be objected to by an Examiner pursuant to
s 42 of the Act as being contrary to law. This is particularly true in relation to the registration of a
129
130
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Objections to, or cancellation of, registration would be more likely to succeed for
either non-use, confusion, or other potential infringement actions, as opposed to
being classified as “scandalous”. Marks which incorporate elements of personal,
racial, ethnic or religious abuse will also be considered “scandalous” and refused
registration. Some of these are identified below.

trademark including a geographical name where the goods include wines in Class 33, when the
grapes used to produce the wines are not from a location with that geographical name, and that
geographical name is a protected geographical name or more commonly known as a geographical
indication [hereinafter “GI”]. Further, a trademark including a geographic name may suggest that
goods and services bearing that trademark are related to or originate from a location with that
geographical name. Accordingly, such a mark would be held likely to deceive or cause confusion
under s 43 of the Act, and hence may be objected to during the examination of the application for
registration if the goods or services are not in association with a location bearing the geographical
name.)
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Daring Wine Producer Names and other Registered Marks in Australia (Select)

Jealous Bitch Cabernet Sauvignon, Australia
Jealous Bitch Chardonnay, South Eastern
Australia
God’s Hill Wines
Good Catholic Girl
Hellfire Bluff Distillery
Illegal Tender Rum
Made Bastard
Some Young Punks
The Wicked Virgin
Big Ass (producer)

Sexycat Liquor
Trademark

Associate Case (if any)

POMMIEBASHER

LOOK
GOOD
FEEL
GOOD
ROOT GOOD
KUNT
NUCKIN FUTS

Re
POMMIEBASHER
[2011] ATMO 45

+
=

Cosmetic, Toiletry and
Fragrance Association
Foundation v Fanni
Barns Pty Ltd (2003) 57
IPR 594
Kuntstreetwear Pty Ltd’s
Trade Mark Application
(2007) 73 IPR 438

Refused under s.42(a)
Trade Marks Act 1995
(Cth)?
No

No

Reason?
Part of “ordinary and
acceptable, if colorful
and
colloquial,
language”, and does
not suggest that such
a person “engages in
racial vilification, or is
prone to verbal abuse”
although
it
was
arguably
“crude”,
“explicit” and in “bad
taste”

Yes

Similar to explicit word.

No

Held not to contain an
obvious, “up front”
scandalous element,
but rather a more
subtle play on words.

The above examples demonstrate the kinds of phrases which, as subjects of trademark applications
including for the purposes of wine, will always attract a ground for rejection under subsection 42(a):
•
•
•
•

3

Marks with elements of personal abuse (e.g. ROOT YOU, <politician’s name>);3
Marks incorporating racial or ethnic abuse (e.g. F**K <country or ethnic group name>);
Marks incorporating abuse of a national flag (e.g. F**K with the Australian flag forming the
stars); and
Marks incorporating elements of religious intolerance/abuse (e.g. ALL <name of religion>S
ARE EVIL).

In the United States, “Root You” takes on a different meaning as is commonly used to refer to “barrack”, or “support” a team.

Trademarks incorporating words and images that appear to condone and/or
promote violence, racism or sociopathic behaviors fall within the ambit of
“scandalous” marks. Again, the reference needs to be obvious within the trademark
before grounds for rejection can be raised. Of interest in respect of the above
comments, is a case decided in the Local Court of New South Wales, Police v
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135

Butler,
which incorporates a discussion of “offensive” language. While it is not a
trademark case, the discussion there points to the way community acceptance of this
kind of language changes over time.
Whether a word considered by many as offensive language is acceptable as a
trademark will depend to some degree on the amount of “invention” and
“imagination” used to present it. Phonetic equivalents of strong but commonly used
expressions, such as PHAR QUE or FAR KEW, will generally be acceptable if the
expression is sufficiently modified by way of humor, thoroughly idiosyncratic spelling
(for example, DR PHUQ) or other factors (for example, disguising the word within a
device element). Conversely, an overt phonetic equivalent such as FUK M, FUCT or
F CK where the difference in spelling is minor and it is not softened by anything in
the way of humour or subtlety, is still sufficiently scandalous as to require an
objection, as is the word concerned spelt out in full.
Similarly, in one of Australia’s neighboring countries, New Zealand, applications
incorporating bad language have previously been refused registration, such as
136
“BULLSHIT”.
Over the last 18 years, however, a number of trademarks which
allude to potentially offensive things have been registered. These include “5hit,”
“CNUT,” “FCUK,” “WNAK,” as well as several marks incorporating “Bitch,” such as
“Stich ‘n Bitch.” This suggests allusions to obscenity in “witty” phrases or plays on
words may no longer be considered offensive by a substantial number of people and
reflects the subjective nature of the offensiveness ground and the increasing
prevalence and tolerance of bad language.
It appears that less commonly used expressions, particularly where they also
have a double meaning, are far less likely to be offensive to any significant element of
society. Calculated concealment of the words, or a clever disguising within a device
element may create an acceptable trademark. Clever advertising campaigns may
bring words regarded as coarse into almost acceptable usage. An example here is the
television campaign bringing the term “BUGGER” into prominence. There are now a
number of registrations containing this word, something that would have been
unlikely 20 years ago.
Profanity is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as:
“characterized by irreverence or contempt for God or sacred things;
irreligious, especially speaking or spoken in manifest or implied contempt
for sacred things.”
The Registrar has historically been particularly careful in the handling of
trademarks which may have religious connotations. Religion is an issue often
surrounded by strong feelings. Particular care needs to be taken with applications
incorporating profanity or religious images. Again, the offending words/images need
Police v. Butler [2003] NSWLC 2 at [11].
Trade Marks Act 2002, s 17 (N.Z.). A trademark is not registrable under New Zealand’s
Trade Marks Act 2002 if it is contrary to New Zealand law, or its use or registration would be likely
to offend a significant section of the community, including M ori. The degree of offensiveness must
be enough to cause outrage amongst a substantial number of people, although a trademark may be
registrable if it is merely vulgar or in poor taste.
135
136
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to be obvious within the mark, as grounds for rejection are not appropriate if there is
only a vague suggestion that something might be profane.
Events post September 2001 have made the public more conscious of issues such
as terrorism, and trademarks with suggestions of violence along these lines may
cause more public concern than they might have in the past. For example, a
trademark application for ADOLF HITLER would likely be rejected on the basis that
it would glorify terrorism or that it could harm public order and morals.
There is a difference between standards used to determine whether a mark is
“scandalous,” and whether a mark’s “use” is contrary to law (which is not
137
comprehensively discussed in this article).
Registration of trademarks has been
opposed under this provision on a wide range of possible illegal uses (e.g. breaching
138
legislation), including claims that use of the mark would constitute:
137 See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 42(b) (Austl.). Unlike the 1905 Act, section 28 of the Trade
Marks Act 1955 (Cth) distinguishes “use,” “deception,” and “confusion” from marks that “comprise or
contain scandalous matter”:
A mark – (a) the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion; (b) the
use of which would be contrary to law; (c) which comprises or contains scandalous
matter; or (d) which would otherwise be not entitled to protection in a court of
justice, shall not be registered as a trade mark.
Reference to “which comprises or contains” scandalous matter also distinguishes trademarks
from other intellectual property, such as designs, but is broadly defined. The Trade Mark Act 1995
goes further by listing these under a separate subsection. The term “comprises” is used in the 1905
Act and, unlike reference to “consists” in the 1995 Act, is an open-ended (i.e. inclusive) term with the
potential to lead to ambiguities in lieu of listing other factors other than “scandalous matter.” But
see, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006) (Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration,
referring to both “Consists of or comprises immoral”). See also, In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d
327, 328 (Cust. & Pat. App 1938). The Court has noted, however, that the word “comprises” meant
“includes” at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1905, and thus Congress extended the
prohibition not only to marks that consist of scandalous matter, but also to marks that include
scandalous matter.” On the other hand, “consists” is close-ended claim language, which means that
there are recited elements and no more. Marks such as “FCUK”, for example, would be more likely
deemed as “comprising” scandalous matter.
138 It must be clear to the Registrar that use of the trademark would, rather than simply could,
be illegal: see Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 42(b) (Austl.). See, Advantage-Rent-A-Car Inc. v.
Advantage Car Rental Proprietary Ltd. (2001) 52 IPR 24; [2001] FCA 683; BC200103001 at [21]
(The illegality must be in relation to use of the mark). Compare with Air Express Int’l Proprietary
Ltd. v. Australian European Ins. Proprietary Ltd. (1999) 49 IPR 435 at 440 (citing Arthur Fairest
Ltd.’s Application (1951) 68 RPC 197) (Earlier decisions took a narrower view, requiring the
illegality to be inherent within the mark itself). See, e.g., Advantage-Rent-A-Car Inc. v. Advantage
Car Rental Proprietary Ltd. (2001) 52 IPR 24; [2001] FCA 683; BC200103001; Health World Ltd v.
Shin-Sun Austl. Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 64 IPR 495; [2005] FCA 5; BC200500010. See also Tommy
Hilfiger Licensing Inc. v. Tan (2002) 60 IPR 137; [2002] ATMO 87; Intermatch Swed. Aktiebolag v.
Dick Smith Inv. Proprietary Ltd. (2003) 56 IPR 575; [2003] ATMO 18; Gap Inc. v Gen. Pants Co.
Proprietary Ltd. (2004) 60 IPR 486; [2004] ATMO 12; Chiropractors’ Ass’n of Austl. Ltd. v. Kincare
Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 66 IPR 180; [2005] ATMO 10 at [19]; Marco Polo Foods Proprietary Ltd. v.
Benino Fine Foods Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 67 IPR 179; [2005] ATMO 32 at [30]; GSM Proprietary
Ltd. v. Blue Star Holdings Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 67 IPR 194; [2005] ATMO 44 at [25]; McWilliams
Wines Proprietary Ltd. v. Lovedale Chamber of Commerce (2007) 72 IPR 169; [2007] ATMO 8
(breach of legislation must be caused by the actual use of the trademark, and not by other conduct or
dealings, before trademark registration will be denied). See also, Marco Polo Foods Proprietary Ltd.
v. Benino Fine Foods (Austl.) Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 67 IPR 179; (2005) AIPC at [92-108]; [2005]
ATMO 32 at [30]; G Johns Orchards v. Cianfrano (2005) 68 IPR 175; [2005] ATMO 73 at [31]
(Illegality in use must be proved on the balance of probabilities, on the basis of a hypothetical case
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•
•
•
•

139

Copyright infringement;
140
Passing off;
141
Breach of contract or agreement;
Breach of other legislation (e.g. labelling laws or the Consumer
142
Protection Act 2010 (Cth)), prior court order or settlement; or

drawn from the evidence and submissions before the Registrar). Whether or not use of the proposed
mark would be contrary to law is determined as at the priority date for registration, although
looking forward towards prospective use of the mark after registration: Time Warner Ent. Co. LP v.
Stepsam Invest. Proprietary Ltd. (2003) 134 FCR 51; 59 IPR 343; [2003] FCA 1502; BC200307818 at
[47].
139 See, e.g., Hisense Corp. v. Zheng Shi (2005) 66 IPR 413; [2005] ATMO 38 at [17]
(Infringement of copyright requires unauthorized copying of a substantial part of a copyright work.
Device marks have for these purposes been treated as artistic works protected by copyright). See
also, Australian Home Loans Ltd. v. Phillips & Technocrat Computing Proprietary Ltd. (1998) 40
IPR 392; Advantage-Rent-A-Car Inc. v. Advantage Car Rental Proprietary Ltd. (2001) 52 IPR 24;
[2001] FCA 683 (opposition on the basis of alleged copyright infringement was successful); Hisense
Corp. v. Zheng Shi (2005) 66 IPR 413; [2005] ATMO 38 at [10]-[19]; Body Tease Inc. v D & Y Int’l
Trading Proprietary Ltd. (2002) 56 IPR 543; [2002] ATMO 102; Cranbrook Sch. v. Wylie (2004) 63
IPR 222; [2004] ATMO 49 (use of school badge on clothing). See also, KARO STEP Trade Mark
[1977] RPC 255. Opposition on the basis of alleged copyright infringement was unsuccessful in Polo
Sport Clothing Am. v. Hill (2003) 57 IPR 288 at 302-3; [2003] ATMO 8 (ownership of copyright in
clip-art not established); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Supermarketing Proprietary Ltd. (2002) 56 IPR
330; [2002] ATMO 74 (opponent would have difficulty establishing copyright subsisted in short
slogan); Chiropractors’ Ass’n of Austl. Ltd. v. Kincare Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 66 IPR 180; [2005]
ATMO 10 at [11]-[19] (complaint related mainly to exploitation of an idea or concept, which is not
protected by copyright; applicant’s mark further appeared to be the product of independent original
work rather than having been copied).
140 In considering whether use of a mark would constitute passing off, the party asserting its
reputation must establish that it had the requisite reputation in the name or goods in the
jurisdiction and that there is a likelihood of deception among consumers or potential consumers
resulting from the respondent’s actions. This test appears to be directed at assessing the reputation
amongst relevant consumers, not the general public. This requires an applicant to prove that there
are, within the relevant jurisdiction, a substantial number of persons who were aware of the
applicant’s name or product and are possible consumers. It is necessary to show in a practical and
business sense a sufficient reputation in the forum and this requires an evaluation of the size and
distribution of the population of prospective consumers likely to be affected. See ConAgra Inc. v.
McCain Foods Proprietary Ltd. [1992] FCA 159 and the discussion in Hansen. Opposition on the
basis of alleged passing off was successful in G Johns Orchards v. Cianfrano (2005) 68 IPR 175;
[2005] ATMO 73 at [31]-[34]. Opposition on the basis of alleged passing off was unsuccessful in
Cadbury Schweppes Proprietary Ltd. v. Effem Foods Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 66 IPR 387; [2005]
ATMO 29 at [42].
141 United Parcel Service of Am. Inc. v. United Air Lines Inc. (2006) 69 IPR 663 at [29]-[39]
(opposition unsuccessful; applicant’s mark used for services that were outside the scope of a
worldwide co-existence agreement between the parties and therefore not a breach of that agreement
that would amount to a use contrary to law); San Pelligrino SPA v. CSP Int’l Industria Calsze SPA
(2006) 71 IPR 158; [2006] ATMO 90 (request to extend protection of international trademark to
Australia refused as use of the mark in Australia would breach an international contract).
142 For oppositions based on alleged misapplication of geographical indications protected by the
Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code see Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Dewitt & Tormey (2006) 69
IPR 637; [2006] ATMO 43 at [26]-[31] (opposition unsuccessful). For oppositions on the basis of
alleged breach of Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Act 1980 (Cth) (the ‘AWBC Act’), see Re
Lawrence (2005) 67 IPR 455; [2005] ATMO 69 (‘First’ not used as geographical indication contrary to
the AWBC Act; registration allowed). For oppositions based on alleged breaches of Olympic Insignia
Protection Act 1987 (Cth), see Australian Olympic Comm. Inc. v. Thompson (2000) AIPC ¶91-658;
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Misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to the Competition and
143
Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Cth)

What is scandalous will be a “matter of opinion” since “opinions change over
144
time”.
However, marks which lack an obvious “scandalous” element, or which are
softened using humour, plays on words, unusual spelling or concealment within a
device may be granted registration. Even where an alleged infringement involves a
parody, the only question is whether the elements of the cause of action have been
145
made out.

Australian Olympic Comm. Inc. v. Courier Luggage Proprietary Ltd. (2002) 54 IPR 419; [2002]
ATMO 2 (opposition unsuccessful; OLYMPIA mark unlikely to be mistaken for protected Olympic
expression); Australian Olympic Comm. Inc. v. ERI Bancaire Luxembourg SA (2006) 69 IPR 135;
[2006] ATMO 29 at [19]-[31] (opposition unsuccessful; mere use of the word ‘Olympic’ in a mark,
without more to suggest a connection with the IOC, was not enough to constitute use for commercial
purposes in breach of the Act). The argument that registration of a trademark which would result in
a loss of equities in an opponent’s mark, in contravention of Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 21(2),
would also be contrary to law for the purposes of s 42(b) was raised but not made out on the facts in
Geoffrey Inc. v. Hoyle (2004) 63 IPR 196; [2004] ATMO 44 at [26] (comparison drawn with trademark
dilution arguments, however any equities the opponent might have relied on were held to have been
exhausted in the circumstances of the case). For opposition based on use contrary to prior order of
the court, see R & C Products Pty Ltd v Bathox Bathsalts Proprietary Ltd. (1991) 21 IPR 547; sub
nom Bathox Bathsalts Proprietary Ltd. v. R & C Prod. Proprietary Ltd. (1991) AIPC ¶90-816. For an
alleged breach of a prior settlement agreement, see Levi Strauss & Co v Menaker (2006) 70 IPR 418;
[2006] ATMO 81. See also Sydney Organising Comm. for Olympic Games v. Thompson (2000) AIPC
¶91-657 (opposition based on Sydney 2000 (Indicia and Images) Protection Act 1996 (Cth)
(repealed)); Re Application by Kelly (1987) 8 IPR 667; (use contrary to Advance Australia Logo
Protection Act 1984 (Cth)); Re Application by Slaney (1985) 6 IPR 307 (MEDICARE refused
registration as use was contrary to Health Legislation Amendment Act 1984 (Cth) (repealed)).
143 Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.). Although section 42(b) is
rarely invoked by the Trade Marks Office in the registration process, use of a trademark will be
contrary to law if it would constitute misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to section 18 of the
Australian Consumer Law [hereinafter “ACL”], or the making of false or misleading statements
contrary to s 29 of the ACL, or passing off. In considering whether a case of misleading or deceptive
conduct or passing off would be made out, the court will consider whether the applicant has
established a reputation in the marks which would be appropriated by the respondent. Case law
indicates that in determining whether use of a mark will breach Australian consumer law, the court
will consider whether a “significant proportion” of the general public will be confused by the use, not
whether the target market for the impugned product will be confused. Although reputation and
confusion amongst the target market may suffice to establish sufficient reputation and deception
among the general public. See, Marco Polo Foods Proprietary Ltd. v. Benino Fine Foods Proprietary
Ltd. (2005) 67 IPR 179; [2005] ATMO 32 (The test is whether there is a ‘real and not remote chance
or possibility’ of a reasonably significant number of people being misled or deceived by use of the
mark); GSM Proprietary Ltd. v .Blue Star Holdings Proprietary Ltd. (2005) 67 IPR 194; [2005]
ATMO 44 at [26]; G Johns Orchards v. Cianfrano (2005) 68 IPR 175; [2005] ATMO 73 at [37].
144 MARK DAVISON & IAN HORAK, SHANAHAN’S AUSTRALIAN LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND PASSING
OFF 234 (5th ed. 2012).
145 See, McIlenny v. Blue Yonder Holdings Proprietary Ltd. (1997) 149 ALR 496 and Pacific
Dunlop v. Hogan (1989) 14 IPR 398.

[18:421 2019]Scandal in the US and Australian Wine Industry! Trademarks and GIs
As a Consumer Magnet?
455

2. Pushing the Boundaries – Scandal in the US!
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act endorses refusal by the PTO of any mark that is
146
scandalous or disparaging. Specifically, Section 2(a) states:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account
of its nature unless it (a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous
matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt,
or disrepute.147
146 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). Two prohibitions in Section 2(a) – that against registration of
“scandalous” marks and that against registration of “immoral” marks – can be treated as a single
category. As a practical matter, no reported decision has barred registration of a mark on the sole
grounds that it is immoral, see, e.g., McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Mavety Media,
1993 TTAB Lexis 25, at *1 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1993); rather, the issue of “immorality,” where it arises at
all, is subsumed into the analysis of whether the mark is “scandalous.” See, e.g., id. at *1, n. 2.
(“Where refusals have been made for both reasons, the cases seem to focus almost exclusively upon
the issue of whether a mark is scandalous.”). For a listing of the relevant state statutes, see John V.
Tait, Note, Trademark Regulations and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
897, 907 n.74 (1998). The legislative history of Section 2(a) is diagonal as to why the Lanham Act
denies registration to scandalous, or disparaging matter. Two general theories have been offered by
courts and commentators: First, the government should not waste its resources on protecting
unseemly marks. See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“We do not see
[Section 2(a)] as an attempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the Congress that such
marks [should] not occupy the time, services, and use of funds of the federal government.”). But see
id. at 487 (Rich, J. dissenting) (“More ‘public funds’ are being expended in the prosecution of this
appeal than would ever result from the registration of the mark.”); Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and
Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should be Federally Registrable, 6
FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 199 (1996) (arguing that because the PTO’s trademark operations are entirely
funded by application and maintenance fees, it is the PTO’s opposition to a mark, rather than its
approval, that is more likely to cause expenditure of federal funds”). These arguments ignore the
potential deterrence effect of the PTO denying registrations to allegedly scandalous and disparaging
marks, however. Second, the government should not provide official sanction to unseemly marks.
See, e.g., Bruce C. Kelber, “Scalping the Redskins:” Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams
Bearing Native American Nicknames and Images on the Road to Racial Reform?,” 17 HAMLINE L.
REV. 533, 560-61 (1994) (“[T]he government has a substantial interest in prohibiting certain marks
from carrying the implied approval of the federal government” and “does not want to encourage
these marks by granting exclusive ownership.”). But see In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (“the act of registration is not a government
imprimatur or pronouncement that the mark is a ‘good’ one in an aesthetic, or any analogous,
sense”). Other commentators, however, argue that all marks should be registered, regardless of
their content, and that the marketplace should decide what is or is not acceptable commercial
behavior. Such explanations are mere speculation, however, as Congress has given no signal of its
intent in enacting the prohibitions of Section 2(a).
147 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). The specific language of Section 2(a) states that registration shall
be refused if the mark consists of matter that: (1) is scandalous; (2) is immoral; (3) is deceptive; (4)
may disparage persons (living or dead), institutions, beliefs, or national symbols; (5) may bring
persons (living or dead), institutions, beliefs, or national symbols into contempt or disrepute; or (6)
may falsely suggest a connection with persons (living or dead), institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols. Thus, while the first three categories ban registration of any mark that “is” scandalous,
immoral, or deceptive; the latter three categories, on the other hand, ban registration of any mark
that “may” fall within one of the proscribed categories. See infra note 116 (discussing the
significance of the word “may” in this context). In addition, once a mark has been placed on the
Principal Register, it can be cancelled or opposed in an inter partes proceeding under the same
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While the Lanham Act bars the registration, it does not prohibit the use of
148
scandalous and disparaging marks.
Claimants can, therefore, continue to use
marks that have been denied federal registration and to claim the common law rights
149
that might attach to them.
Notwithstanding that the Lanham Act directs the
USPTO to refuse registration to scandalous marks, nowhere does the Act define
150
“scandalous.”
Courts and administrative bodies have generally looked to
standard. 15 U.S.C. § 1063-64 (2006). Registration of matter that is “deceptive” is also barred under
the Lanham Act, as a public policy matter, the Act does not permit registration of marks that
deceive the public. Section 2(a)’s prohibition against registration of deceptive marks is distinct from
Section 2(e)’s ban against registration of “deceptively misdescriptive” marks, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1)
(2006) unless they have become distinctive of the applicant’s goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)
(2006). The focus here is on the prevention of deception to the public–one of the two basic objectives
of the Lanham Act, see supra note and accompanying text, as opposed to the content-based basis of
other parts of Section 2(a). Section 2(a) prohibits registration of marks that disparage: (1) persons;
see Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 888 (C.C.P.A. 1969); (2) institutions;
see Gavel Club v. Toastmasters Int’l, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 88, 89 (T.T.A.B. 1960) (unincorporated
fraternal-type associations); Frederick Gash, Inc. v. Mayo Clinic, 461 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(professional organizations); In re NAFTA, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (NAFTA is an
institution); (3) beliefs; and (4) national symbols. See In re Anti-Communist World Freedom
Congress, Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 304, 305 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (case law indicates that national
symbols of other countries are also protected by Section 2(a)). While the Act also prohibits
registration of marks that may bring living or dead persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols
into “contempt” or “disrepute,” I could find no reported decision that relied solely on those grounds
in denying registration of a mark; rather, this ban seems to be subsumed into the ban again
“disparaging” marks. In Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1641
(T.T.A.B. 1988), for example, the Board stated:
[T]he offensiveness of the [challenged] design becomes even more objectionable
because it makes a statement about opposer itself, and holds opposer up to
ridicule and contempt.
The Act also prohibits registration of marks consisting of or comprising matter that may falsely
suggest a connection with living or dead persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols. This
section is quite similar to Section 2(d)’s ban against registration of marks that are likely to confuse,
see 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), and the two grounds are often pled together as alternative grounds for
opposing a mark registration. See, e.g., Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Ritz Closet Seat Corp., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1466 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
148 See Hinchliffe supra n. 1.
149 See Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 546 (1920) (“refusal to
register a mark does not prevent a former user from continuing its use, but it deprives him of the
benefits of the statute”); 74 Am.Jur. 2d Trademarks and Trade Names § 70 (2012) (“the denial of an
application for registration of a mark does not, of itself, prevent the continued use thereof by the
applicant; it merely deprives him of the benefit of the protection accorded to the registered marks”).
Restatement (First) of Torts §726 (1939), however, provides that a “designation cannot be a trademark or trade name if it is scandalous or indecent, or otherwise violates a defined public policy.” In
addition, 47 states have statutes denying registration to scandalous, immoral, and disparaging
marks. Only Hawaii, Maine, and Wisconsin do not. See Justin G. Blankenship, Casenote, The
Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate
Solution for Words that Offend, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 415, 451-52 n.231-232 (2001) (collecting
statutes).
150 Although the Act also refers to “immoral” marks, very few cases have focused on this term
and indeed, most cases that address the term seem to treat the term as synonymous with
“scandalous.” See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“Because of our
holding that appellant’s mark is ‘scandalous,’ it is unnecessary to consider whether appellant’s mark
is ‘immoral.’ We note that the dearth of reported trademark decisions in which the term ‘immoral’
has been directly applied.”).
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151

dictionaries for a definition of the term. In re Riverbank Canning Co., for example,
152
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
quoted from two well-known
dictionaries in defining “scandalous” as:
[S]hocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful;
offensive; disreputable; giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; …
[or] calling out [for] condemnation.153
154

Similarly, in Bromberg v. Carmel Self Service, Inc.,
the Board relied upon
dictionary definitions in stating that “scandalous” means “that which offends
established moral conception or disgraces all who are associated or involved” and “to
155
horrify or shock the moral sense.”
156
The extrusive 1999 decision, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc.,
attempted to clarify
the tests for both disparaging and scandalous marks. Disparaging marks are ones
that “may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
157
disrepute.”
“Persons” includes both natural and “artificial” persons, such as
158
corporations. Despite the numerous cases on scandalous marks, only a select few
159
have involved disparaging marks.
Like the term “scandalous”, “disparage” is not
160
defined in the Lanham Act. Courts have, however, appeared to give “disparage” its
“ordinary and common” meaning as stated in dictionaries contemporaneous with the
161
passage of the 1946 Act. For example, content that “may dishonour by comparison
with what is inferior, slight, deprecate, degrade or affect or injure by unjust
162
comparison.” This is unlike scandalousness, which looks to the conscience or moral

In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
Id. This is the predecessor to the Federal Circuit. Prior to the creation of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on October 1, 1982, appeals from the TTAB were hear by
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.)). The CCPA merged with the United States
Claims Court to form the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (The
Federal Circuit promptly established that all decisions of the C.C.P.A. are binding precedents in the
Federal Circuit).
153 In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d at 328 (quoting FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW
STANDARD DICTIONARY and WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1932) in
interpreting predecessor statute to Lanham Act).
154 Bromberg v. Carmel Self Service, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
155 Id. at 178 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTONARY (2d ed.)).
156 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1749 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (Ultimately, the
Board found that the Redskins marks were disparaging to Native Americans, but were not
scandalous to the general public).
157 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). Section 1127 defines “person” as including “a juristic person as well
as a natural person.”
158 See, e.g., Order Sons of Italy in Am. v. Profumi Fratelli Nostra AG, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1221, 1223 (T.T.A.B. 1995) (granting standing to a fraternal order of Italian Americans to challenge
a mark with Mafia connotations).
159 See supra note __ and accompanying text.
160 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006). Legislative history sheds very little light on what Congress intended
this prohibition to encompass. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737-38 n.78.
161 Id. at 1738.
162 Id.
151
152
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feelings of a substantial composite of the general public, “disparagement has an
163
identifiable object.”
Figure 5:

Table of court cases where determination of whether a mark has been scandalous
or disparaging

Freedom of Speech
Case
Matal v Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (June 19, 2017

In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15,
2017) (Iancu v. Brunetti (Case No. 18-302))

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 22272231 (2015)

In re McGinley, 14. 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981)

Relevant Take-Away
Trademark: THE SLANTS.
Affirming the Federal Circuit’s holding that the
disparagement prong of Section 1052(a) was
unconstitutional.
Trademark: FUCT.
Federal Circuit followed its earlier instincts that that
the “immoral . . . or scandalous” clause is an
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment’s
free speech clause. Free to speak but not to
register
Claim that an ordinance which created different
categories of signs, including “Ideological Sign[s],”
“Political Sign[s],” and “Temporary Directional
Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event” violated
Freedom of Speech.
The refusal to register a mark under section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act did not suppress freedom of
expression.

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
Case
In re Mavety Media Group Ltd, 1993 TTAB LEXIS
25, *1 n 2
Bromberg v. Carmel Self Service Inc., 198
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978)

Relevant Take-Away
The case law does not contain any distinctions
between "scandalous" and "immoral"
The Board relied upon dictionary definitions in
stating that:
“scandalous” means “that which offends established
moral conception or disgraces all who are associated or
involved” and “to horrify or shock the moral sense.” (at

In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1471
(T.T.A.B. 1988)

178)
Trademark BIG PECKER BRAND.
The standards for determining whether a mark is
scandalous are “somewhat vague” and the
determination of the issue “necessarily. . . highly
subjective”.
In reversing the examiner’s denial of registration
to the mark BIG PECKER BRAND as being
scandalous, the Board stated that:
“the inclusion of the bird design would make it less
likely that purchasers would attribute any vulgar
connotation to the word mark…”. (at 1472).

Similarly, in concurrence, Board Member Cissel
wrote in that “To suggest that a significant number of
potential purchasers of applicant’s shirts would be
offended by applicant’s trademark for them is . . .
unfounded …” (at 1472 (Cissel, concurring))

Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc. 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999)

163

Id. at 1739.

Attempted to clarify the tests for both disparaging
and scandalous marks.
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The Board examined an objection brought by
several Native Americans alleging that the mark
REDSKINS for a football team was both
scandalous and disparaging. Ultimately, the Board
found that the Redskins marks were disparaging
to Native Americans, but were not scandalous to
the general public.
The Board stated that the public’s acceptance of
the word “Redskins” was “inconsistent with the sense
of outrage by a substantial composite of the general
population that would be necessary to find this word
scandalous in the context of the subject marks and the
identified services.” 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.

In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 865
(T.T.A.B. 1981)

Application of test – standard of public.

In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 329
(C.C.P.A. 1938)

Application of test – standard of public.
The CCPA stated:

In re Old Glory Condom Corp. 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993):

In re Riverbank Canning Co. 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A.
1938)

“[W]e reject applicant’s argument that the question is
whether its mark is scandalous should be evaluated in
the setting of its posh clientele …. [I]t seems to us that
we are required to apply a broader standard … [W]e
could not possibly apply a standard of public policy to the
question before us which would be limited to a particular
stratum of society, defined by its level of ‘sophistication,’
or, as others might perceive it, its level of vulgarity.”).

“[W]e feel certain that [the] use [of the mark MADONNA]
upon wine for beverage purposes would be shocking to
the sense of propriety of nearly all who do not use wine
as a beverage, and also to many who do so use it;
therefore, we think such use of the word “Madonna”
would be scandalous and its registration prohibited
under [the 1095 Trade-Mark Act].”
“What was considered scandalous as a trademark or
service mark twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago may no
longer be considered so, given the changes in societal
attitudes. Marks once thought scandalous may now be
thought merely humorous (or even quaint).” (at 1219)

The CCPA (the predecessor to the Federal Circuit)
quoted from two well-known dictionaries in defining
“scandalous” as:
“[S]hocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety;
disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; giving offense to the
conscience or moral feelings; … [or] calling out [for]
condemnation.” (at 328)

The CCPA has also held that “the threshold for objectionable matter is lower” for
scandalous matter under Section 2(a) than for “obscene” matter under the First
Amendment.164 The latter is of present relevance following the In re Brunetti
decision, raising the potential opportunity for scandal in the US wine industry.
164 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (where the court also held that
dictionary definitions of the term “scandalous” were precise enough to satisfy due process
requirements. Id. at 485). See also, Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140, 1143
(D.D.C. 2000), (where the district court noted that no court had yet ruled on whether the definition
of “disparaging” was so vague as to deny due process, but declined to decide the issue, stating that
the avoidance doctrine required federal courts to exhaust all non-constitutional avenues for
resolving a case before turning to constitutional arguments. The McGinley court also determined
that a refusal to register a trademark on the grounds that it is scandalous does not violate First
Amendment free speech rights (at 484)). A number of commentators disdain the ruling in McGinley,
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3. First Amendment
In recent years, courts have grappled with the application of First Amendment
principles to the law governing trademark registration. This is because in
determining whether a mark may be registered, the USPTO reviews the mark under
the standards imposed by the Lanham Act and decides whether it may be
165
registered.
By the terms of § 2(a), the determination requires the USPTO to
166
examine the content of the mark and thus the content of the speech. This led to the
question of whether § 2(a)’s requirement that the USPTO consider the content of a
167
trademark applicant’s speech violated the First Amendment.
168
In Matal v. Tam,
the United States Supreme Court held that the bar on
disparaging trademarks in § 2(a) was unconstitutional under the First
169
Amendment. Although, they declined to address whether trademarks were purely
commercial speech or a hybrid of commercial and expressive speech because the
disparagement clause could not prevail under the standard of review associated with
170
either category.
The Court found that mere registration was insufficient to
transform expressive ideas into government speech and trademarks were entitled to
171
First Amendment protection.
The Court also noted that neither the interest of
preventing underrepresented groups from being “‘bombarded with demeaning
messages in commercial advertising’” nor the interest of protecting the “orderly flow
of commerce” was sufficient to withstand intermediate scrutiny and thus the § 2(a)
172
bar on disparaging marks was unconstitutional.
173
In In re Brunetti,
the Federal Circuit invalidated the immoral-scandalous
provision on the ground that it conflicted with the First Amendment, which allowed
the mark FUCT to be registered. While allowing FUCT to be registered was proper,
the majority erred in concluding there was no reasonable interpretation of the
174
immoral-scandalous provision that could preserve its constitutionality.
It is
improper to prevent the registration of marks that are merely “immoral” or
“scandalous,” but First Amendment jurisprudence indicates it would proper to
narrow the bar to prevent only the subset of immoral or scandalous marks that are
arguing that Section 2(a) does violate First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Baird supra note 55, at 68586; Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter Under
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered Trademark?, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 345-47 (1993); Tait supra note 296, at 936. See also, Hinchliffe supra note 1.
165 See Id. § 1051.
166 See Id. § 1052.
167 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
168 Id. at 1765.
169 Id. In Tam, Simon Tam, a member of The Slants, an Asian American rock group, attempted
to register “THE SLANTS” as a trademark: Id. at 1751, 1754. The USPTO denied the application on
the basis of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act because the Examiner found the mark violated the provision
prohibiting “the registration of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or
disrepute’ any ‘persons, living or dead’” because “slants” is a derogatory term for people of Asian
descent: Id. at 1751 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)). The T.T.A.B. affirmed the Examiner, but the
Federal Circuit reversed: id. at 1754.
170 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764–65.
171 Id. at 1760
172 See id. at 1764–65
173 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1357
174 Id.
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also obscene. Because courts have a duty to preserve the constitutionality of a
175
statute unless there is no reasonable interpretation,
the majority failed its duty
when it rejected a rational interpretation of the immoral scandalous provision. The
concurring opinion, which suggested preserving the statute by limiting its reach to
176
obscene marks, had the correct analysis of the case.
D. Scandal in the Wine Industry and Implications for Branding of Wines
This article discussed the acute legal dimensions of branding, labelling and
intellectual property law. It highlighted that brands are distinct from intellectual
property rights, which are both interdependent to and dependent on labelling laws
with regards wine. This is because a brand (insofar as a unique identifier is
concerned) in the form of a mark allows the consumer (and obviously the winery) to
build a linkage across the aggregate category of wine products.
A regulatory framework and laws therein can facilitate effective communication
177
of information about a good by virtue of the legal regimes that it embodies.
The
objectives of a legal regime, whether (e.g. in the case of the trademark regime, or GI
regime) that legal regime facilitates communication of information, and what
stakeholders (e.g. consumers of wine) look for and which drive their decision making
to buy the product are factors interwoven into assessing the preference for and value
attributed to branding and/or origin of wine.
Usefully for consumers the distinctness of a mark provides them with an
opportunity to ‘retaliate’ by changing their loyalty when the expected quality is not
178
delivered.
Wine (an experience good) may be either frequently or infrequently
179
purchased.
Trademarks work because consumers have sufficient memory of the
previous act of consumption, and the distinctive mark allows them to identify a
180
product.
Their preference is because even while the consumer may not have
experience with the specific product, they may have experience with other products
within a broader category.
In Australia, labelling laws require the origin of the wine–namely the wine’s GI–
to be included on a label. Other branding recognition, e.g. the name of a winery, or
one of their products, may be achieved through the trademark regime. Compared to
the US, this is a more conservative standard. Nevertheless, the trademark regime
does take into account changes in consumer perception and, in so doing, has the
proven ability to influence consumer preference (insofar as what is acceptable and
not) with regards wine products.
This article highlighted that the present state of IP law with respect to
trademarks in the US allows for a plethora of opportunity for funky and unique
See id. at 1358 (Dyk, J., concurring).
Id. at 1357–61.
177 See Sarah Hinchliffe, supra note 10, Part II (discussing that effective communication of
information is defined differently depending on the context – i.e. in the context of trademarks, and
from a purely economic perspective); Posner, supra note 115 at 292-3.
178 See id., at Part VI.
179 See Economides, supra note 115 at 526.
180 See supra note 115 at 499-500, mentioning also that a consumer may “link it to expected
quality”.
175
176
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branding of wines. Existing registration of trademarks such as “Fat Bastard” notes
that the boundaries of what is considered disparaging or scandalous is very narrow.
Nonetheless, following Brunietti and Tam, it seems that the sky is the limit for there
to be some “scandal” in branding of wine labels!

